Formulate the following game as an extensive game with imperfect information. The game begins with player1 receiving a card that is either H or L with equal probabilities. Player 2 does not see the card. Player 1may announce that their card is L, in which case they must pay $1 to player 2, or may claim that their cardis H, in which case player 2 may choose to concede or to insist on seeing player 1s card. If player 2 concedesthen they must pay $1 to player 1. If instead they insists on seeing player 1s card then player 1 must pay$4 if the card is L, and must pay her $4 if the card is H. Find the Nash equilibria of this game.
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