Stanford University Renewable Energy Policy Essay TOPIC (that I have a short reading for and a powerpoint): Compare and contrast renewable energy policy ac

Stanford University Renewable Energy Policy Essay TOPIC (that I have a short reading for and a powerpoint): Compare and contrast renewable energy policy across the US, China and Australia.

5 PAGES. FORMAL ESSAY. APA format. Double spaced, times new roman, 12 pt font. 5 pages does NOT include title page, abstract page, or works cited page. That being said, I need a title page, abstract, and works cited. Outside resources is good but make sure readings are included.

Paper Description:

The aim of the paper is comparative inquiry and analysis, not mere description. The emphasis is on reasoning and critical thinking. It is not enough simply to recapitulate what each reading has to say about a given theme. You must compare and contrast what they have to say about a topic of your own choosing. To do this, you must evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the types of analysis and theories presented, and offer some conclusion of your own. Thus, each paper should include the following:

A clear, persuasive introduction with an explicit thesis statement and a roadmap to tell me where and what you will try to demonstrate in the paper.
A very brief summary or literature review of the selected readings for the paper, with an emphasis on key arguments, type of analysis and conclusions found in each work. Avoid summarizing details. Stick to the main points.
A brief summary of the theme to be discussed in your paper. What are the issues involved and why are they important? What do we learn from each paper?
A comparative inquiry and analysis of what the readings have to say about the theme. What do we learn from these discussions? How does the chosen analysis advance or weaken the key arguments? Which cultural or political perspectives are at play? What remains to be learned? America’s Energy Edge: The Geopolitical Consequences of the Shale Re…
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America’s Energy Edge: The Geopolitical Consequences of the Shale Revolution
Blackwill, Robert D; O’Sullivan, Meghan L. Foreign Affairs 93.2 (Mar/Apr 2014): 102-114.
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Abstract (summary)
Only five years ago, the world’s supply of oil appeared to be peaking, and as conventional gas production declined in the US, it seemed that the country
would become dependent on costly natural gas imports. But in the years since, those predictions have proved spectacularly wrong. Global energy
production has begun to shift away from traditional suppliers in Eurasia and the Middle East, as producers tap unconventional gas and oil resources around
the world, from the waters of Australia, Brazil, Africa, and the Mediterranean to the oil sands of Alberta. The American energy revolution does not just have
commercial implications; it also has wide-reaching geopolitical consequences. Global energy trade maps are already being redrawn as US imports continue
to decline and exporters find new markets. A diminished reliance on energy imports should not be confused with full energy independence. But the US
energy windfall should help put to rest declinist thinking about the US.
Full Text
Only five years ago, the world’s supply of oil appeared to be peaking, and as conventional gas production declined in the United States, it seemed that the
country would become dependent on costly natural gas imports. But in the years since, those predictions have proved spectacularly wrong. Global energy
production has begun to shiftaway from traditional suppliers in Eurasia and the Middle East, as producers tap unconventional gas and oil resources around
the world, from the waters of Australia, Brazil, Africa, and the Mediterranean to the oil sands of Alberta. The greatest revolution, however, has taken place
in the United States, where producers have taken advantage of two newly viable technologies to unlock resources once deemed commercially infeasible:
horizontal drilling, which allows wells to penetrate bands of shale deep underground, and hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, which uses the injection of
high-pressure fluid to release gas and oil from rock formations.
The resulting uptick in energy production has been dramatic. Between 2007 and 2012, U.S. shale gas production rose by over 50 percent each year, and its
share of total U.S. gas production jumped from five percent to 39 percent. Terminals once intended to bring foreign liquefied natural gas (lng) to U.S.
consumers are being reconfigured to export U.S. lng abroad. Between 2007 and 2012, fracking also generated an 18-fold increase in U.S. production of
what is known as light tight oil, high-quality petroleum found in shale or sandstone that can be released by fracking. This boom has succeeded in reversing
the long decline in U.S. crude oil production, which grew by 50 percent between 2008 and 2013. Thanks to these developments, the United States is now
poised to become an energy superpower. Last year, it surpassed Russia as the world’s leading energy producer, and by next year, according to projections
by the International Energy Agency, it will overtake Saudi Arabia as the top producer of crude oil.
Much has been written lately about the discovery of new oil and gas deposits around the world, but other countries will not find it easy to replicate the
United States’ success. The fracking revolution required more than just favorable geology; it also took financiers with a tolerance for risk, a property-rights
regime that let landowners claim underground resources, a network of service providers and delivery infrastructure, and an industry structure characterized
by thousands of entrepreneurs rather than a single national oil company. Although many countries possess the right rock, none, with the exception of
Canada, boasts an industrial environment as favorable as that of the United States.
The American energy revolution does not just have commercial implications; it also has wide-reaching geopolitical consequences. Global energy trade maps
are already being redrawn as U.S. imports continue to decline and exporters find new markets. Most West African oil, for example, now flows to Asia rather
than to the United States. And as U.S. production continues to increase, it will put downward pressure on global oil and gas prices, thereby diminishing the
geopolitical leverage that some energy suppliers have wielded for decades. Most energy-producing states that lack diversified economies, such as Russia
and the Gulf monarchies, will lose out, whereas energy consumers, such as China, India, and other Asian states, stand to gain.
The biggest benefits, however, will accrue to the United States. Ever since 1971, when U.S. oil production peaked, energy has been construed as a strategic
liability for the country, with its ever-growing thirst for reasonably priced fossil fuels sometimes necessitating incongruous alliances and complex obligations
abroad. But that logic has been upended, and the newly unlocked energy is set to boost the U.S. economy and grant Washington newfound leverage around
the world.
THE PRICE IS RIGHT
Although it is always difficult to predict the future of global energy markets, the main effect the North American energy revolution will have is already
becoming clear: the global supply of energy will continue to increase and diversify. Gas markets have been the first to feel the impact. In the past, the price
of gas has varied greatly across the three largely distinct markets of North America, Europe, and Asia. In 2012, for example, U.S. gas prices stood at $3 per
million btu, whereas Germans paid $11 and Japanese paid $17.
But as the United States prepares to generate and export greater quantities of lng, those markets will become increasingly integrated. Already, investors
have sought government approval for more than 20 lng export projects in the United States. However many end up being built, the exports flowing from
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them will add to major increases in the flow of lng that are already occurring elsewhere. Australia is soon set to surpass Qatar as the largest global supplier
of lng; by 2020, the United States and Canada together could export close to Qatar’s current lng capacity. Although the integration of North American,
European, and Asian gas markets will require years of infrastructure investment and the result, even then, will not be as unified as the global oil market,
the increased liquidity should help put downward pressure on gas prices in Europe and Asia in the decade ahead.
The most dramatic possible geopolitical consequence of the North American energy boom is that the increase in U.S. and Canadian oil production could
disrupt the global price of oil-which could fall by 20 percent or more. Today, the price of oil is determined largely by the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries, which regulates production levels among its member states. When there are unexpected production disruptions, opec countries
(primarily Saudi Arabia) try to stabilize prices by ramping up their production, which reduces the global amount of spare production capacity. When spare
capacity falls below two million barrels per day, the market gets jittery, and oil prices tend to spike upward. When the market sees spare capacity rise
above roughly six million barrels a day, prices tend to fall. For the past five years or so, opec’s members have attempted to balance the need to fill their
public coffers with the need to supply enough oil to keep the global economy humming, and they have managed to keep the price of oil at around $90 to
$110 per barrel.
As additional North American oil floods the market, opec’s ability to control prices will be challenged. According to projections from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration, between 2012 and 2020, the United States is expected to produce more than three million barrels of new petroleum and other
liquid fuels each day, mainly from light tight oil. These new volumes, plus new supplies coming on line from Iraq and elsewhere, could cause a glut in
supply, which would push prices down-especially as global oil demand shrinks due to improved efficiency or slower economic growth. In that event, opec
could have a hard time maintaining discipline among its members, few of which are willing to curb their oil production in the face of burgeoning social
demands and political uncertainty. Persistently lower prices would create shortfalls in the revenues they need to fund their expenditures.
WINNERS AND LOSERS
If oil prices fall and stay low, every government in the world that relies on hydrocarbon revenues will find itself under stress. Countries feeling the pinch will
include Indonesia and Vietnam in Asia; Kazakhstan and Russia in Eurasia; Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela in Latin America; Angola and Nigeria in Africa;
and Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. These countries’ abilities to endure such fiscal setbacks vary and would depend in part on how long low
prices lasted. Even with a more moderate drop in prices, the increased volume and diversity of the oil supply would benefit energy consumers worldwide.
Countries that like to use their energy supplies for foreign policy purposes-usually in ways that run counter to U.S. interests- will see their influence shrink.
Of all the governments likely to be hit hard, Moscow has the most to lose. Although Russia possesses large reserves of shale oil that it could eventually
develop, the global supply shiftwill weaken the country in the short term. The influx of North American gas to the market will not entirely free the rest of
Europe from Russia’s influence, since Russia will remain the continent’s largest energy supplier. But additional suppliers will give European customers
leverage they can use to negotiate better terms with Russian producers, as they managed to do in 2010 and 2011. Europe will gain most from the change if
it further integrates its natural gas market and builds more lng terminals to import gas; such moves could help it ward offcrises like those that occurred
when Russia cut offgas supplies to Ukraine in 2006 and 2009. The development of Europe’s own considerable shale resources would help even more.
A sustained drop in the price of oil, meanwhile, could destabilize Russia’s political system. Even with the current price near $100 per barrel, the Kremlin has
scaled back its official expectations of annual economic growth over the coming decade to around 1.8 percent and begun to make budget cuts. If prices fall
further, Russia could exhaust its stabilization fund, which would force it to make draconian budget reductions. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s influence
could diminish, creating new openings for his political opponents at home and making Moscow look weak abroad.
Although the West might welcome the thought of Russia under such strain, a weaker Russia will not necessarily mean a less challenging Russia. Moscow is
already trying to compensate for losses in Europe by making stronger inroads into Asia and the global lng market, and it will have every reason to actively
counter Europe’s efforts to develop its own resources. Indeed, Russia’s state-run media, the state-owned gas company Gazprom, and even Putin himself
have warned of the environmental dangers of fracking in Europe- which is, as The Guardian has put it, “an odd phenomenon in a country that usually keeps
ecological concerns at the bottom of its agenda.” To discourage European investment in the infrastructure needed to import lng, Russia may also
preemptively offer its European customers more favorable gas deals, as it did for Ukraine at the end of 2013. More dramatically, should low energy prices
undermine Putin and empower more nationalist forces in the country, Russia could seek to secure its regional influence in more direct ways-even through
the projection of military power.
Energy producers in the Middle East, meanwhile, will lose influence, too. As the longtime regulator of opec’s spare capacity and a regional leader, Saudi
Arabia merits special attention. The country is already facing growing fiscal constraints. It responded to the Arab Spring by boosting public spending at
home and offering generous economic and security assistance to other Sunni regimes in the region. As a result, since 2008, the kingdom’s fiscal breakeven
oil price (the level needed to ensure its budget balances) jumped over $40 per barrel to nearly $90 in 2014, according to the International Monetary Fund.
At the same time, more pressure is coming from the country’s extremely young population, which is demanding better education, health care,
infrastructure, and jobs. And as its enormous domestic energy demand continues to grow, the country will begin consuming more energy than it exports by
around 2020, should current trajectories hold. Riyadh is already trying hard to diversify its economy. But a prolonged decline in the price of oil would test
the regime’s ability to maintain the public services on which its legitimacy rests. Other Middle Eastern countries-including Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Libya, and
Yemen-are already living beyond the limits of their fiscal breakeven prices.
Iran, already staggering under the weight of economic sanctions and years of economic mismanagement, could face even more severe challenges. The
country ranks fourth in the world in oil and gas production, and it depends on its energy supplies to project regional influence. But of all opec’s members, it
has the highest fiscal breakeven price: over $150 per barrel. Although it is possible that lower prices might further diminish the legitimacy of the regime
and thereby pave the way for more moderate leaders, the fate of the recent revolutions in the Middle East, as well as Iran’s own ethnic, religious, and other
cleavages, caution against such optimism.
The net implications for Mexico are less clear. Given its declining oil production and heavy reliance on oil revenues for its budget, the country could well
suffer if the price of oil drops. The recent push for energy reforms could allow Mexico to increase production enough to outweigh the effects of lower global
prices. Doing so, however, would require the government to follow up on the reform law passed in December. It would have to implement legislation more
conducive to private investment in Mexico’s energy sector-including its own shale resources-and accelerate its reform of Pemex, the state-owned oil
company.
Unlike energy producers, consumers should welcome the energy revolution. Increased North American production has already helped buffer markets by
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providing much-needed additional production during recent disruptions of exports from Libya, Nigeria, and South Sudan. Lower energy prices will be a
particular boon for China and India, which are already major importers and which, according to the International Energy Agency, will see their demand for
oil imports grow by 40 percent (for China) and 55 percent (for India) from 2012 to 2035. As the two countries import more energy from the Middle East and
Africa, they will take ever-greater interest in these regions.
China also stands to benefit in another way: its relations with Russia could improve markedly. For decades, history and ideology have kept these two
countries from finding common cause, despite the obvious benefits that would accrue from a closer partnership between the world’s largest energy producer
and its largest consumer, which happen to share a 2,600-mile border. But as more and more North American energy comes on line, energy demand in the
developed world remains flat, and demand continues to increase in the developing economies of Asia, Russia will increasingly seek to secure markets in the
East. Moscow and Beijing could well move closer together on long-stalled energy deals and pipelines and collaborate more on energy issues in Central Asia.
Once clinched, such arrangements could form the basis for a more extensive geopolitical relationship-one in which China would have the upper hand.
As for India and other Asian economies, the benefits will also go beyond the purely economic. A surge in the quantity of gas and oil transported through the
South China Sea will provide common cause to all countries seeking to combat piracy and other risks to the free flow of energy shipments, giving China
greater incentives to cooperate on security matters. At the same time, U.S. allies in East Asia, such as Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea, will have
the opportunity to increase their energy imports directly from the United States and Canada. Their ability to rely on North American partners, shipping oil
and lng via shorter, more direct sea routes, should also give these countries greater peace of mind.
THE U.S. ADVANTAGE
The biggest beneficiary of the North American energy boom, of course, will be the United States. The most immediate effect will be the continued creation
of new jobs and wealth in the energy sector. But beyond that, since U.S. gas is among the cheapest in the world, U.S. industries that rely primarily on gas
for feedstock, such as petrochemicals and steel, will continue to see their competitive advantages grow. The energy boom is also providing an economic
fillip by fueling investments in U.S. infrastructure, construction, and services. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that by 2020, unconventional oil and
gas production could boost the United States’ annual gdp by between two and four percent, or roughly $380-$690 billion, and create up to 1.7 million new
permanent jobs. Furthermore, since energy imports account for roughly half of the more than $720 billion U.S. trade deficit, declining energy imports are
already leading to a more favorable U.S. trade balance.
A diminished reliance on energy imports should not be confused with full energy independence. But the U.S. energy windfall should help put to rest declinist
thinking about the United States. Moreover, the end of U.S. dependence on overseas energy supplies-and on the producer countries with which Washington
has often had prickly relations-will grant the United States a greater degree of freedom in pursuing its grand strategy. But the United States will remain
firmly linked to globalized energy markets. Any dramatic disruption of the global oil supply, for instance, would still affect the price at the pump in the
United States and derail growth. Washington will therefore maintain an interest in preserving the stability of international markets. Nowhere is that truer
than in the Middle East, where vital U.S. interests-in preventing terrorism, countering nuclear proliferation, and promoting regional security to protect allies
such as Israel and ensure the flow of energy-will endure. So will the need to police the global commons, such as the major sea-lanes through which trade in
energy and other goods flows.
These truths remain poorly understood, however. U.S. policymakers need to start explaining to both domestic and foreign audiences that although the
energy landscape is changing, U.S. national interests are not. Newfound oil and gas will not cause Washington to disengage from the world. To be sure, the
United States will remain, by almost an…
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