Cuyamaca College Leonardo Coutinhos The Evolution of the Most Lethal Criminal Review FOR THIS ASSIGNMENT, YOU ARE TO READ A JOURNAL ARTICLE ABOUT A TOPIC R

Cuyamaca College Leonardo Coutinhos The Evolution of the Most Lethal Criminal Review FOR THIS ASSIGNMENT, YOU ARE TO READ A JOURNAL ARTICLE ABOUT A TOPIC RELATED TO A REGIONAL TOPIC WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE CLASS, AND YOU ARE ASKED TO USE ARTICLES FROM THE JSTOR DATABASE. THE REPORT IS TO BE 5-6 PAGES IN LENGTH. PLEASE BE SURE TO USE BOTH A TITLE PAGE AND WORKS CITED PAGE. (TITLE AND WORKS CITED PAGES DO NOT COUNT TOWARD THE OVERALL PAGE COUNT OF YOUR REVIEW) YOU ARE ALSO ENCOURAGED TO FOLLOW THE MLA OR CHICAGO FORMATS TO DEVELOP THIS REPORT. PLEASE DOUBLE-SPACE YOUR REVIEW. AND IN YOUR WORKS CITED PAGE, PLEASE LIST THE NAME OF THE ARTICLE THAT YOU WILL BE SUMMARIZING AND ANALYZING. THIS AN EXAMPLE OF THE TYPE OF THE FORMAT YOU SHOULD FOLLOW:
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PLACE USE THIS ARTICLE ATTACHED BELOW TO FINISH THE REVIEW. THANK YOU! Institute for National Strategic Security, National Defense University
The Evolution of the Most Lethal Criminal Organization in Brazil—the PCC
Author(s): Leonardo Coutinho
Source: PRISM , Vol. 8, No. 1, SECURITY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE (2019), pp. 56-67
Published by: Institute for National Strategic Security, National Defense University
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26597310
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COUTINHO
Firefighters fighting a fire in one of the 90 buses destroyed in a series of attacks coordinated by the PCC in São Paulo in May
2006. (Folhapress/ Rogério Cassimiro/)
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The Evolution of the Most
Lethal Criminal Organization
in Brazil—the PCC
By Leonardo Coutinho
B
razil is the country of soccer. This statement is significant as a reference to one of the elements of
Brazilian national and sub-group identity formation, and as a catalyst of social cohesion.1 The national
sport of Brazil is also, not surprisingly, the favorite of Brazilian prisoners. In each of Brazil’s 1,496
prisons there is a soccer field—whether designed specifically for this purpose or simply improvised in areas
intended for sunbathing inmates.2 In the early 1990s, there were only eight inmates from the state capital
in the Taubaté prison in São Paulo.3 Surrounded by inmates transferred from the various hinterland areas
around São Paolo who considered them arrogant, the eight capital city thugs joined in a mutual protection
pact within the prison. This was the origin of the “Capitals” gang.
The Capitals formed a soccer team that competed against other teams in the prison. On August 31, 1993
the Capital prisoners held a self-organized championship soccer tournament, appearing at the first game
wearing standard white T-shirts; scrawled in blue ballpoint pen ink on the left breast were three letters—PCC,
referring to Primeiro Comando da Capital, or First Capital Command. After the tournament the PCC assassinated the most feared criminals in Taubaté prison, earning the respect and loyalty of their fellow inmates and
establishing themselves as the new prison bosses.4
In 1993 Brazil’s prisons were still reeling from what had until then been the biggest ever outbreak of
prison violence. Less than a year earlier, 111 inmates were shot dead by police in an operation to stem a rebellion in the Carandiru prison in São Paulo city. The tragedy began as a banal fight between two rival gangs
for possession of a few boxes of cigarettes.5 In 1993, as they assumed the dominant position within the prison
gang hierarchy, the PCC adopted the discourse of unity, arguing that in the previous year’s carnage the prisoners themselves were to blame as they were fratricidal and ungoverned by an organization strong enough to
keep the peace amongst them and represent them both inside and outside the prisons. An inmates’ charter
was drafted and the criminals pledged to the motto, “Brother does not kill brother. Brother does not exploit
brother. The ‘Founders’ are the leaders.”6
The PCC operational foundation was based on two pillars. Internally, PCC inmates would submit to
a new rule, behaving in a more coordinated but less confrontational fashion, protecting their own, but still
Brazilian journalist Mr. Leonardo Coutinho is a former editor and foreign correspondent in Washington, D.C. for Brazilian
magazine VEJA (2000–18). Translated from Portuguese by Michael Rodelo.
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COUTINHO
liquidating their rivals. Externally, the PCC would
provide unified legal assistance, supported by the
monthly contributions from each of the incarcerated members, who were required to make
payments to the organization through their family
members. Inspired by, and organizing along, the
trade union model, the PCC attracted an ever-increasing number of members. And its modernizing
message, which transcended the message of a
conventional gang, was exported to several other
prisons by transferred PCC members. By 1995, the
PCC would win control within the Carandiru penitentiary, which was at the time the largest prison in
Latin America.
The Second Phase
In the beginning PCC financial revenues were not
exclusively the product of crime. As noted, each
PCC member paid a monthly fee to the organization’s funds supply, even while they engaged
independently in various forms of criminal activity.
While conventional prison gangs used violence to
recruit and control, PCC resorted to such violence
only in exceptional situations. Older criminal
organizations, such as the Comando Vermelho (Red
Command or CV), centered their business models
on drug trafficking, while the PCC was trying to
establish itself as a “self-help society.”7
In 1999, a bank robber named Marcos Williams
Herbas Camacho, known by the nickname Marcola,
joined the PCC leadership. Of Bolivian descent
Marcola, who was considered a genius among
criminals, imposed a new dimension on the organization’s business model. By that time PCC not only
dominated more than two dozen prisons, it also
controlled thousands of members free on the streets.
The emerging PCC leader understood that at-large
members were a precious asset to the organization,
useful for increasing revenue, influence, and power.
Under Marcola’s management, the PCC began its
consolidation as what Max Manwaring called a
“second generation gang,” organized as much for
business as for control of the local terrain.8 Marcola
not only expanded PCC activity in drug trafficking
and bank robbery (the latter his specialty), he also
led the organization to adopt a market view of crime
and to conquer market share by way of violence,
sweeping away competitors.
The PCC grew in obscurity thanks to the
Brazilian government’s denial of its existence.
Within the public security structure PCC was not
considered a serious threat. It was only in 1996 that a
deputy from the State of São Paulo became the first
Brazilian authority to publicly refer to the organization. PCC was first mentioned in the Brazilian press
only a year later, but still no one took them seriously.
The PCC, according to the governor of São Paulo,
was “a fiction.” The government’s strategy to dismantle PCC was to deny its existence and separate
its leaders by transferring them to prisons in other
cities and states.
That policy of separation failed. By sending
“graduate” members of the PCC to other parts of
the country, the government unwittingly helped the
PCC to expand its domain throughout Brazil. These
transferred inmates served as “ambassadors” of the
organization wherever they went. Many were from
the largest and richest of the Brazilian states and came
with experience in organizational innovation which
greatly exceeded the local gangs. They represented
an organization that was able to provide protection
beyond the prison walls and São Paulo state borders.
To reinforce this dynamic, PCC itself started riots,
thereby provoking the state to react by sending members to other prisons throughout Brazil.9
In February 2001, the PCC seized the Brazilian
public’s attention when 28,000 inmates took control of 29 prisons in nineteen cities in the state
of São Paulo.10 The mega-riot took place on a
Sunday, during visiting time. No less than 10,000
people were taken hostage. Sheets painted with
the PCC insignia were hung on the windows. In
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THE MOST LETHAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION IN BRAZIL
Figure 1: Brazil’s prison crisis.
? Prisoners (in thou)
0
? Prison capacity (in thou)
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
*2016 data: January–June
Source: The Brazil Report, “Brazil’s Prison Crisis.” Reproduced unaltered with permission from The Brazil Report; data from
Brazil’s Ministry of Justice.
Carandiru—the very prison where 111 people
had been killed in a conflict with police a decade
before—the PCC held 5,000 hostages. Twenty-seven
hours later, the hostages would be freed and the riot
controlled, but the PCC’s relationship with the state
would never be the same.
Insurgency as a Political Instrument
Having demonstrated its capacity for mobilization
and upon realizing the impact caused by what would
be considered the biggest riot in Brazil’s history, PCC
leaders were convinced of their ability to confront,
embarrass, and blackmail the state. The organization’s debut proved so successful that the PCC began
to call itself the “Party of Crime.” Soon after this
first collective action, and less than a decade after its
establishment, the PCC adopted an action plan that
would define it as a “third-generation gang” with a
political agenda and transnational connections.
Another critical milestone in the evolution of
the PCC was the 2002 arrest and incarceration in
Brazil of Chilean terrorist Mauricio Hernández
Norambuena. Norambuena was a member of the
Patriotic Front Manuel Rodríguez (FPMR) and
had master-minded the kidnapping of a Brazilian
businessman.11 A fugitive from Chilean justice
since 1996, Norambuena, known as “Commander
Ramiro,” was the operational leader of FPMR.
In his own country, he had twice been sentenced
to life imprisonment for the murder of a senator
and kidnapping of a businessman. Considered
the second in the FPMR hierarchy, Norambuena
coordinated numerous bombings and kidnappings.
Investigations in Brazil revealed that Norambuena
received training and the rank of Colonel from the
Cuban Army.12 This militant from the armed left,
highly proficient in insurgency actions, was imprisoned in a cell with Marcola.
According to Attorney Marcio Sérgio
Christino—one of the first authorities to act in the
fight against the PCC—the Marcola-Norambuena
partnership marked a new phase for the organization. The cerebral Marcola became a student of
Norambuena. He learned the concepts of asymmetric warfare and urban guerrilla warfare, and
he further developed the political program of the
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COUTINHO
PCC, as a way of guaranteeing the perpetuation of
the criminal enterprise which, at that moment, was
undergoing full expansion in Brazil.
On March 7, 2002, just one month after the
union of Marcola and Norambuena, the PCC
attempted its first terrorist attack in São Paulo. An
automobile loaded with 40 kilograms of powergel
(emulsion) explosives was parked in front of the
Barra Funda Forum, where 5,000 people worked and
another 7,000 transited each day. Due to a device
flaw, the attack failed.
Police monitoring of telephone conversations
between PCC members, by means of bugged cell
phones surreptitiously provided to prisoners, revealed
the PCC mission orders to disrupt the upcoming
São Paulo gubernatorial election. The content of the
audios would only become public four years later.13
From their prison cells, the PCC leaders planned a
series of incidents to discredit the incumbent governor seeking re-election. According to the audios,
PCC had chosen the leftist opposition Workers Party
(PT) candidate and would work towards his election.
On the eve of the first round of elections, the PCC
leadership issued an order that all family members
of the prisoners vote for their candidate. To ensure
greater participation in the polls, the organization
Police forces prepare for the invasion of a detention unit of juvenile offenders under the command of the PCC, in São
Paulo. The teenagers rebelled under the coordination of the faction that recruits its members from youth. (Folhapress/
Fernando Donasci/)
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THE MOST LETHAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION IN BRAZIL
determined that there would be no family visits on
election day in order to maximize turnout.
The PCC’s electoral effort appears to have succeeded. The faction’s preferred candidate managed
to reach the second round of the 2002 election for the
São Paulo governorship. As the campaign progressed
to the next stage, Marcola and the PCC top leadership
made the drastic decision to attack Brazil’s economy
by blowing up the São Paulo stock exchange. The
impact of this they believed would favor the leftist
candidate, and could also change the course of the
presidential election later that year. According to
experts who followed the evolution of the PCC, it was
the guerrilla mind of Norambuena that brought PCC
to the terrorism toolbox. Fortunately the attack was
disrupted when police wiretapping led to discovery of
a car loaded with 66 pounds of explosives just six days
before the second round of elections. For more than
a year and a half, Marcola and Norambuena continued to share ideas inside Taubaté prison. Treated as
a brother by faction members, Norambuena gained
leadership status.14
In 2006—a year in which it was believed that
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) would not
be reelected due to an investigation of his government’s involvement in what was known as the
Mensalão scandal—the PCC attacked again.15 The
single “grand attack” strategy that had failed twice
was replaced by a series of actions comprising a
massive wave of PCC violence. During a nine-day
period, the PPC conducted 293 attacks on police
stations and public buildings. Dozens of buses were
set on fire and São Paulo—the largest city in Latin
America—was paralyzed by the wave of terror.
The PCC eventually signed a truce when
the São Paulo government agreed to secret negotiations.16 The complete terms of the agreement
were never disclosed, but after Marcola received a
high-level government delegation in the prison, he
ordered his followers to abort the operation. Marcola
got what he wanted—the state entered into a direct
dialogue with the PCC. To “reward” the government
for this dialogue, the PCC established a truce that,
according to some experts on violence in Brazil, had
direct implications on the profile of violence in São
Paulo state and later in other regions of the country.
The main Brazilian cities were experiencing a homicide boom; São Paolo being one of the most violent
in the world had homicide rates that reached 66 per
100,000 inhabitants.17 After the truce between PCC
and the government, the number of deaths in the
state of São Paulo began declining to the extent that
by 2016, the homicide rate was 46 percent lower.18
One of the pioneering studies of the PCC’s impact
on the homicide rate concluded that the faction had
become a “monopolist” of death.19 Crimes previously uncontrolled came under the management of
the PCC leaders.20 The PCC began to determine who
dies, how many die, and when they die. Marcola
successfully exported this system to other parts
of Brazil on the grounds that the broader society
should be spared from the violence meant exclusively for PCC’s enemies.21
The ability to influence or even credibly
threaten the government and intervene in the daily
life of Brazilian society defines PCC as what U.S.
Army War College Professor Max Manwaring called
a “third generation gang.”22 The evolution of the
PCC suggested that the organization not only began
to implement actions advancing a political and economic agenda, it also began to act as a transnational
criminal organization. Nonetheless, while the PCC
arguably meets the requirements of Manwaring’s
concept of third generation gangs, there is still
debate among scholars and experts as to whether the
organization has reached this level.23
By 2016 the Minister of Justice and the
President of the Superior Electoral Court of Brazil
believed they had found the first evidence of politics
mimicking organized crime.24 Their investigation
indicated that, of a total of 730,000 donations registered to the candidates and parties that contested
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COUTINHO
that year’s elections for mayors and city councilors,
at least 300,000 were from people without sufficient
financial means to make such contributions. Early
indications were that organizations such as the PCC
were behind this financial scheme. Their assessment
revealed that the campaign of overt PCC attacks
during previous presidential election years had
been replaced by a strategy of political interference
behind the scenes. The PCC had started to invest in
and elect candidates within the established political process. Evidence has subsequently emerged in
several parts of the country that politicians linked
to organized crime actually won their elections.25
In 2018, eight of Brazil’s 27 states requested federal
troop reinforcements fearing armed interference
by criminal factions, the most powerful of which is
the PCC.26 But by that time the political action of
organized crime in Brazil was no longer based in
explicit violence. Criminal organizations instead
have begun to play a leading role in formal political activities and disputes.27 They finance not only
candidates who serve their interests, but also those
who promote the political campaigns of their own
members.28 In the State of Ceará, one of the main
PCC bases outside of São Paulo, the local government intelligence agencies investigated ten mayors
and fifty councilmen who received election support
from the PCC.29
PCC pressure and influence on the decisions
of the political system eventually increased to such
alarming levels that it provoked a reaction from the
authorities. In April 2016 the government of the
State of Ceará planned to install systems for blocking telephone communication in prisons, pending
the approval of a law by the State deputies. After
several riots and retaliatory protests, the PCC left
a car with 29 pounds of explosives parked in front
of the legislature building in the city of Fortaleza.
The criminals themselves warned the police of the
device, but that threat alone was sufficient to gain a
postponement of the legislation for several months;
and even after the law was eventually passed, the
blockers were never installed in prisons.
Territorial Domain and Finance
At least 27 gangs are active in Brazil according to
security and intelligence agencies.30 The PCC is
the largest, with an estimated 30,000 members
who exercise control over 90 percent of the prison
population,or 550,000 prisoners.31 The first South
American countries in which the PCC extended its
dominions were Paraguay, Bolivia (where it operates
almost monopolistically), Peru, and Colombia; all
countries in which suppliers compete with rivals CV,
the second largest gang in Brazil.32
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