Rethinking Authenticity in Tourism Article Analysis The critique (where appropriate) can consider a) the importance of the subject b) the practical impli

Rethinking Authenticity in Tourism Article Analysis The critique (where appropriate) can consider

a) the importance of the subject

b) the practical implications for management

c) the theoretical contribution to knowledge

d) the pertinence of the research paradigm and method of research/thought to the research question

e) appropriateness of samples

f) understanding of research results by the authors

To really be able to address the concepts in this paper you should be aware of the work of Eric Cohen, viz,

Cohen, E.

1979a Rethinking the Sociology of Tourism. Annals of Tourism Research 6:18Ð35. 1

1979b A Phenomenology of Tourist Experiences. Sociology 13:179Ð201.

1988 Authenticity and Commoditization in Tourism. Annals of Tourism Research 15:371Ð86.
Pergamon
Annals of Tourism Research, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 349Ð370, 1999
Þ 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
Printed in Great Britain
0160-7383/99 $19.00+0.00
PII: S0160-7383(98)00103-0
RETHINKING AUTHENTICITY IN
TOURISM EXPERIENCE
Ning Wang
Zhongshan University, China
Abstract: This paper aims at a conceptual clarification of the meanings of authenticity in
tourist experiences. Three approaches are discussed, objectivism, constructivism, and postmodernism, and the limits of {{object-related authenticity|| are also exposed. It is suggested that
existential authenticity is an alternative source in tourism, regardless of whether the toured
objects are authentic. This concept is further classified into two different dimensions: intrapersonal and inter-personal. This demonstrates that existential authenticity can explain a
greater variety of tourist experiences, and hence helps enhance the explanatory power of
the {{authenticity-seeking|| model in tourism. Keywords: authenticity, existential authenticity,
tourism, tourist experiences Þ 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Re sume : Pour repenser l|authenticite dans les expe riences du tourisme. Cet article vise a une
clarification conceptuelle des significations de l|authenticite dans les expe riences du tourisme.
On discute de trois facž ons d|aborder le sujet: objectivisme, constructivisme et postmodernisme,
en examinant au me¼ me temps les limites de {{l|authenticite lie e aux choses||. On sugge re que
l|authenticite est une source alternative en tourisme sans conside rer si les objets visite s sont
authentiques. Ce concept est classifie en encore deux dimensions: interpersonnelle et intrapersonnelle. Ceci de montre que l|authenticite peut expliquer un plus grand nombre d|expe riences des touristes, ce qui aide a rehausser le pouvoir explicatif du mode le du {{chercheur
d| authenticite || du tourisme. Mots-cle s: authenticite , authenticite existentielle, tourisme,
expe riences du tourisme. Þ 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
INTRODUCTION
MacCannell (1973, 1976) introduced the concept of authenticity to
sociological studies of tourist motivations and experiences two decades
ago. Since then, the subject has become an agenda for tourism study
(Brown 1996; Bruner 1989, 1994; Cohen 1979a, 1988; Daniel 1996;
Ehrentraut 1993; Harkin 1995; Hughes 1995; Littrell, Anderson and
Brown 1993; Moscardo and Pearce 1986; Pearce and Moscardo 1985,
1986; Redfoot 1984; Salamone 1997; Selwyn, 1996a, Shenhav-Keller
1993; Silver 1993; Turner and Manning 1988; Wang 1997a). However,
with the concept of authenticity being widely used, its ambiguity
and limitations have been increasingly exposed. Critics question its
usefulness and validity because many tourist motivations or experiences cannot be explained in terms of the conventional concept of
authenticity. Phenomena such as visiting friends and relatives, beach
holidays, ocean cruising, nature tourism, visiting Disneyland, personal
Ning Wang is Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at Zhongshan University
Guangzhou, P.R. of China. Email ðlpds@zsulink.zsu.edu.cnŁ). He obtained his PhD degree
from University of Sheffield, UK. His research interest is in the Sociology of Tourism, focusing
on the relationship between tourism and modernity. He is currently writing a book on the
sociology of tourism.
349
350
RETHINKING AUTHENTICITY
hobbies such as shopping, fishing, hunting, or sports, and so on, have
nothing to do with authenticity in MacCannell|s sense (Schudson
1979; Stephen 1990; Urry 1990). According to Urry , {{the {search for
authenticity| is too simple a foundation for explaining contemporary
tourism.|| (1991:51). But still authenticity is relevant to some kinds
of tourism such as ethnic, history or culture tourism, which involve
the representation of the Other or of the past. However, if the concept
is of limited applicability, then how can it be of central importance in
tourism studies? Can one continue to use it while ignoring the difficulties relating to it, discard it altogether, or alternatively, redefine
its meaning in order to justify and enhance its explanatory power?
This paper concentrates on the third choice: rethinking the meanings of authenticity in terms of existential philosophers| usage of the
idea. While the two conventional meanings in the literature (namely,
objective and constructive authenticity) are discussed, its third usage
(existential authenticity) will be suggested as an alternative. This
paper has two aims. First, the three different approaches*objectivism, constructivism, and postmodernism*are reviewed and analyzed. As a result, three different types of authenticity (objective
authenticity, constructive or symbolic authenticity, and existential
authenticity) will be clarified. Second, the paper will suggest that, in
postmodern conditions, both objective and constructive authenticity,
as object-related notions, can only explain a limited range of tourist
experiences, whereas existential authenticity, as activity-related situation, is germane to the explanation of a greater variety of tourist
experiences. Existential authenticity is further classified into two
different dimensions: intra-personal and inter-personal authenticity.
AUTHENTICITY IN TOURISM EXPERIENCE
Authenticity is a term grown ambiguous from varied usages and
contexts (Golomb 1995:7). According to Trilling, the original usage
was in the museum,
where persons expert in such matters test whether objects of art are what
they appear to be or are claimed to be, and therefore worth the price that
is asked for them*or, if this has already been paid, worth the admiration
they are being given (1972:93).
This term was also borrowed to refer to human existence and {{the
peculiar nature of our fallen condition, our anxiety over the credibility
of existence and of individual existence|| (Trilling 1972:93). For example, Rosseau used the word authenticity to refer to the existential
condition of being, and he regarded society as the major cause that
destroyed it.
However, it is mainly its museum-linked usage which has been
extended to tourism. For example, products of tourism such as works
of art, festivals, rituals, cuisine, dress, housing, and so on are usually
described as {{authentic|| or {{inauthentic|| in terms of the criterion of
whether they are made or enacted {{by local people according to
custom or tradition||. [And in this sense], {{authenticity connotes
traditional culture and origin, a sense of the genuine, the real or the
NING WANG
351
unique|| (Sharpley 1994:130). However, the extension of this museumlinked usage to tourism simplifies the complex nature of authenticity
in tourist experiences. First of all, the issue of authenticity in tourism
can be differentiated into two separate issues: that of tourist experiences
(or authentic experiences) and that of toured objects. While these are
two separate aspects of authenticity, they are often confused as one.
Handler and Saxton (1988:243) notice this distinction when they point
out that {{An authentic experience . . . is one in which individuals feel
themselves to be in touch both with a {real| world and with their {real|
selves|| (1988:243). Selwyn (1996a) goes one step further to link the
experience of a {{real|| world to {{authenticity as knowledge||*namely,
{{cool|| authenticity*and to relate the experience of a {{real|| self to
{{authenticity as feeling||*namely, {{hot|| authenticity. However, it
would be wrong to propose that the emotional experience of the {{real||
self ({{hot authenticity||) necessarily entails, coincides with, or results
from the epistemological experience of a {{real|| world out there ({{cool
authenticity||), as if the latter is the sole cause of the former (effect).
As will be shown, this differentiation of {{the authenticity of experiences|| from {{the authenticity of toured objects|| is crucial for introducing {{existential authenticity|| as an alternative source of authentic
experiences. Certain toured objects, such as nature, are in a strict
sense irrelevant to authenticity in MacCannell|s sense. However, nature tourism is surely one of the major ways of experiencing a {{real||
self. That is to say, what nature tourism involves is an existential
authenticity rather than the authenticity of objects.
Second, the complex nature of authenticity in tourism is exhibited
in the fact that it can be further classified into objective, constructive,
and existential authenticity (Table 1). Objective authenticity involves
a museum-linked usage of the authenticity of the originals that are
also the toured objects to be perceived by tourists. It follows that the
authentic experience is caused by the recognition of the toured objects
as authentic. As such, there is an absolute and objective criterion used
to measure authenticity. Thus, even though the tourists themselves
think they have gained authentic experiences, this can, however, still
be judged as inauthentic, if the toured objects are {{in fact|| false,
contrived, or what MacCannell (1973) calls {{staged authenticity||. By
constructive authenticity it is meant the result of social construction,
not an objectively measurable quality of what is being visited. Things
appear authentic not because they are inherently authentic but
because they are constructed as such in terms of points of view,
beliefs, perspectives, or powers. This notion is thus relative, negotiable
(Cohen 1988), contextually determined (Salamone 1997), and even
ideological (Silver 1993). It can be the projection of one|s dreams,
stereotyped images, and expectations onto toured objects (Bruner
1991; Silver 1993). In this sense, what the tourist quests for is symbolic
authenticity (Culler 1981). Here a big distinction arises. Unlike both
objective and constructive (or symbolic) authenticities which involve
whether and how the toured objects are authentic, existential experience involves personal or intersubjective feelings activated by the
liminal process of tourist activities. In such a liminal experience,
people feel they themselves are much more authentic and more freely
352
RETHINKING AUTHENTICITY
Table 1. Three Types of Authenticity in Tourist Experiences
Object-Related Authenticity in Tourism
Activity-Related Authenticity in Tourism
Objective authenticity refers to the authenticity of originals. Correspondingly,
authentic experiences in tourism are
equated to an epistemological experience (i.e., cognition) of the authenticity
of originals.
Existential authenticity refers to a potential existential state of Being that is to
be activated by tourist activities. Correspondingly, authentic experiences in
tourism are to achieve this activated existential state of Being within the liminal
process of tourism. Existential authenticity can have nothing to do with the
authenticity of toured objects.
Constructive authenticity refers to the
authenticity projected onto toured
objects by tourists or tourism producers
in terms of their imagery, expectations,
preferences, beliefs, powers, etc. There
are various versions of authenticities
regarding the same objects. Correspondingly, authentic experiences in
tourism and the authenticity of toured
objects are constitutive of one another.
In this sense, the authenticity of toured
objects is in fact symbolic authenticity.
self-expressed than in everyday life, not because they find the toured
objects are authentic but simply because they are engaging in nonordinary activities, free from the constraints of the daily. Thus, analytically speaking, in addition to objective and constructive authenticities, the existential authenticity is a distinctive source of
authentic experiences in tourism. Unlike the object-related case which
is the attribute, or the projected attribute, of objects, existential
authenticity is a potential existential state of Being which is to be
activated by tourist activities. In this sense, the existential version
can also be understood as a kind of what Brown (1996) calls an
{{authentically good time||. This, as activity-related authenticity, is
thus logically distinguishable from the object-related case (Table 1).
The Approach of Objectivism
In his nostalgic critique of mass tourism in terms of heroic travel
in the past, Boorstin (1964) condemned mass tourism as {{pseudoevents||, which were brought about by the commoditization of culture
and the associated homogenization and standardization of tourist
experiences. For Boorstin, under commoditization, not only are tourist
attractions contrived scenes or pseudo-events, but also the {{tourist
seldom likes the authentic . . . product of the foreign culture; he prefers
his own provincial expectations|| (1964:106). The tourist is thus gullible; {{he is prepared to be ruled by the law of pseudo-events, by
NING WANG
353
which the image, the well-contrived imitation, outshines the original||
(1964:107; the emphasis added). Obviously, Boorstin|s concept of
{{pseudo-events|| implies a concept of objective authenticity. This is
thus the authenticity of the {{original||, and tourist experiences are
kinds of pseudo-events because tourists are seldom able to see through
the inauthenticity of contrived attractions (for a similar view see
Dovey 1985; Fussell 1980).
Whereas Boorstin scorns mass tourism and mass tourists, his critics
such as MacCannell restore the sacredness and quasi-pilgrimage significance of the motivation. Based on Goffman|s (1959) differentiation
of the {{front region|| from the {{back region||, MacCannell points out
that the {{concern of moderns for the shallowness of their lives and
inauthenticity of their experiences parallels concerns for the sacred
in primitive society|| (1973:589Ð590). It is thus justified for tourists to
{{search for authenticity of experience|| (1973:589). However, according to MacCannell, there is increasingly a contradiction between the
tourist|s demand for authenticity (related to a back region) and the
staged authenticity in tourist space. {{It is always possible that what is
taken to be entry into a back region is really entry into a front
region that has been totally set up in advance for touristic visitation||
(1973:597).
As Selwyn indicates, MacCannell uses authenticity in two different
senses: authenticity as feeling and as knowledge (1996a:6Ð7). Indeed,
when MacCannell points out that the tourism involves {{the search
for authenticity of experience|| or for {{authentic experience||, his
tourists are concerned with the state of authentic feelings. However,
when he refers to {{staged authenticity||, then his tourists turn to
quest for the authenticity of originals and consequently become the
victims of staged authenticity. Thus, their experiences can not be
counted as authentic even if the tourists themselves might think they
have achieved such experiences. What is implied here is a conception
of objective authenticity (similar view on {{staged authenticity|| can
also be found in Duncan 1978).
Both Boorstin and MacCannell insist on a museum-linked and
objectivist conception of authenticity when pseudo-events or staged
authenticity is referred to. Touristic search for authentic experiences
is thus no more than an epistemological experience of toured objects
which are found to be authentic. The key point at issue is, however,
that authenticity is not a matter of black or white, but rather involves
a much wider spectrum, rich in ambiguous colors. That which is
judged as inauthentic or staged authenticity by experts, intellectuals,
or elite may be experienced as authentic and real from an emic
perspective*this may be the very way that mass tourists experience
authenticity. Thus, a revisionist position occurs in response to the
complex and constructive nature of authenticity, that is, constructivism.
Constructivism Approach
To view authenticity as the original or the attribute of the original
is too simple to capture its complexity. Thus, authenticity in Mac-
354
RETHINKING AUTHENTICITY
Cannell|s sense has been questioned by many commentators (Bruner
1989:113; Cohen 1988:378; Handler and Linnekin 1984:286; Lanfant
1989:188; Spooner 1986:220Ð221; Wood 1993:58). According to Bruner
(1994), authenticity has four different meanings. First, it refers to the
{{historical verisimilitude|| of representation. This is the authentic
reproduction which resembles the original and thus look credible and
convincing. For instance, the 1990s New Salem resembles the 1830s
New Salem where Abraham Lincoln lived. Second, authenticity means
genuine, historically accurate, and immaculate simulation. In both
the first and the second sense it involves the nature of a copy or
reproduction rather than the original. Museum professionals use
authenticity primarily in the first sense, but sometimes in the second.
Third, authenticity {{means originals, as opposed to a copy; but in this
sense, no reproduction could be authentic, by definition|| (Bruner
1994:400). Four, the term refers to authority or power which authorizes, certifies, and legally validates authenticity. For example,
New Salem is authentic, as it is the authoritative reproduction of New
Salem, the one legitimized by the state of Illinois. There is only one officially
reconstructed New Salem, the one approved by the state government
(Bruner 1994:400).
Thus, as authenticity involves a range of different meanings, to confine
it to the originals is oversimplistic. As a response and revision, the
disciples of constructivism treat it as social construction.
Constructivism is not a coherent doctrine. It is sometimes used
interchangeably with {{constructionism||. Despite their similarities,
the latter stresses the social or intersubjective process in construction
of knowledge and reality, and is often used in conjunction with social*
i.e., {{social constructionism|| (cf. Berger and Luckmann 1971; Gergen
1985; Gergen and Gergen 1991). For the sake of simplicity, in the
discussion below, this will be seen as a sub-perspective of constructivism. There is no space here to rehearse the history of constructivism
and its variants. However, certain basic characteristics of constructivism can be identified (for a detailed discussion, see Schwandt
1994). Its ontological assumption is that {{there is no unique {real
world| that preexists and is independent of human mental activity
and human symbolic language|| (J. Bruner 1986; quoted in Schwandt
1994:125). Reality is rather best seen as the results of the versions of
our interpretations and constructions. It is thus pluralistic and plastic.
Further, constructivists hold a pluralistic and relativist epistemology
and methodology. It is claimed that the validity of knowledge is not
to be found in the relationship of correspondence to an independently
existing world. On the contrary, {{what we take to be objective knowledge and truth is the result of perspective. Knowledge and truth are
created, not discovered by mind|| (Schwandt 1994:125). For constructivists, multiple and plural meanings of and about the same
things can be constructed from different perspectives, and people may
adopt different constructed meanings dependent on the particular
contextual situation or intersubjective setting.
This general constructivist perspective is applied by E. Bruner
(1994), Cohen (1988), Hobsbawn and Ranger (1983), and others,
NING WANG
355
to the issue of authenticity. E. Bruner (1994:407) clearly labels his
treatment of authenticity as {{constructivist perspective||. Although
there may be differences among the holders of constructivism, a few
common viewpoints on authenticity in tourism can be noted. One,
there is no absolute and static original or origin on which the absolute
authenticity of originals relies. {{We all enter society in the middle,
and culture is always in process|| (E. Bruner 1994:407). Two, as the
approach of the {{invention of tradi…
Purchase answer to see full
attachment