What Is the Design Argument for the Existence of God Questions Choose one question to answer (300 words) Read book PART III 8&9 2 Feedback for posts I pro
What Is the Design Argument for the Existence of God Questions Choose one question to answer (300 words) Read book PART III 8&9
2 Feedback for posts I provide (each 150 words)
What is nihilism? Why might someone hold that without God nihilism is inevitable? Would they be right to do so?
What is meant by ultimate justice? Does an objective morality demand ultimate justice? If so, why might this require there to be a God? Does it?
Does an objective morality demand that there is an objective moral authority? If so, then is God the only kind of entity that could play this role? What would the Kantian say is the source of an objective morality?
What is the design argumentfor the existence of God? Is it plausible?
What is the cosmological argumentfor the existence of God? Is it plausible?
What is the problem of evil? Why does this raise a difficulty for the existence of (a perfectly good) God?
What is the Divine Command Theoryof morality? What is the Euthyphro problem, and how does it create difficulties for divine command theory?
What is life like in the state of nature, according to Hobbes? Is Hobbes right that people are in their nature egotistical?
What is the social contractthat Hobbes sets out, and how it supposed to help us avoid the terrible fate of living in a state of nature?
Why does Hobbes hold that we have tacitly consented to the social contract? Is he right? (Is it even possible to tacitlyconsent to a contract?)
How is social contract theory meant to provide a rational foundation for morality, even while granting that morality is a social construction? Is it successful in this regard?
What is the Leviathanthat Hobbes describes, and why does he think that it is necessary?
What is the free-rider problem, and how does it affect the Hobbesian view? Does it pose a seriously difficulty for the position?
What does Rawls mean by the veil of ignorance, and how is this notion meant to help us identify what a just society looks like?
Why does a Rawlsian account of a just society struggle to capture the way in which we are often partialin our moral judgements (e.g., in how we are more concerned to help those in need who are closest to us)? Is this a problem for the view?
Is it psychologically possible to reason under a veil of ignorance as Rawls maintains?
How plausible is it that if we do reason under a veil of ignorance that we will converge on a particular conception of a just society? How might we end up with competing conceptions of a just society? what is this thing
called ethics?
What is morality? How do we define what is right and wrong? How does moral
theory help us deal with ethical issues in the world around us?
This second edition provides an engaging and stimulating introduction to philosophical thinking about morality. Christopher Bennett provides the reader with
accessible examples of contemporary and relevant ethical problems, before looking at
the main theoretical approaches and key philosophers associated with them. Topics
covered include:
life and death issues such as abortion and global poverty;
the meaning of life, whether life is sacred and which lives matter;
major moral theories such as utilitarianism, Kantian ethics and virtue ethics;
critiques of morality from Marx and Nietzsche.
What Is This Thing Called Ethics? has been thoroughly revised and updated
throughout, with a new final chapter on meta-ethics.
With boxed case studies, discussion questions and further reading included within
each chapter, this textbook is the ideal introduction to ethics for philosophy students
coming to the subject for the first time.
Christopher Bennett is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Sheffield, UK.
His research interests include moral, political and legal philosophy. His previous
publications include The Apology Ritual: A Philosophical Theory of Punishment (2008).
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CHRISTOPHER BENNETT
what is this
thing called
ethics?
second edition
First published 2010
This second edition published 2015
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2010, 2015 Christopher Bennett
The right of Christopher Bennett to be identified as the author of this work
has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Bennett, Christopher, 1972What is this thing called ethics? / By Christopher Bennett. — Second edition.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Ethics. I. Title.
BJ1012.B455 2015
170–dc23
2014035414
ISBN: 978-0-415-83232-8 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-415-83233-5 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-0-203-49418-9 (ebk)
Typeset in Berling LT Std by
Saxon Graphics Ltd, Derby
C O NT ENT S
Preface to the second edition
Acknowledgements
Introduction
WHAT IS MORAL THINKING?
WHAT IS MORAL THEORY?
WHY DO WE NEED MORAL THEORY?
IS MORALITY ALL RELATIVE?
WHAT SHOULD WE LOOK FOR IN A MORAL THEORY?
THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK
PART I: LIFE AND DEATH
1 Death and the meaning of life
IS DEATH BAD FOR THE PERSON WHO DIES?
COULD LIFE BE MEANINGLESS?
HEDONISM: THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE
HIGHER PLEASURES?
ARISTOTELIANISM: MEANING IN ACTIVITY
ELITISM
THE OZYMANDIAS PROBLEM
CONCLUSION
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
FURTHER READING
NOTES
2 Which lives count?
SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT KILLING
A STRANGE SUGGESTION
HUMAN LIFE AS SACRED
WHY THINK THAT HUMAN LIFE IS SACRED?
THE SANCTITY OF LIFE IN PRACTICAL DEBATES
CRITICISMS OF THE SANCTITY OF LIFE
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CONCLUSION
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
FURTHER READING
NOTES
3 How much can morality require us to do for one another?
GLOBAL POVERTY: A RADICAL VIEW
DO OTHERS HAVE A RIGHT TO OUR HELP?
THE LIMITS OF THE DUTY TO HELP?
THE RADICALS RESPONSE: ABOLISHING DUTY AND CHARITY
CONCLUSION
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
FURTHER READING
NOTES
PART II: THREE STARTING POINTS IN MORAL THEORY
4 Utilitarianism
WHAT UTILITARIANISM IS
UTILITARIANISM IN PRACTICE: PUNISHING AND PROMISING
SOME FURTHER PROBLEMS THE HARD LIFE OF A UTILITARIAN
TOWARDS A SOLUTION: RULE-UTILITARIANISM
CRITICISMS OF RULE-UTILITARIANISM
SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ABOUT THE NATURE OF HAPPINESS
CONCLUSION
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
FURTHER READING
NOTES
5 Kantian ethics
HUMAN DIGNITY
WHAT IS WRONG WITH TREATING A PERSON AS A MERE MEANS?
HOW DO WE KNOW THAT WE ARE FREE?
HOW TO RESPECT PERSONS AS RATIONAL AGENTS
DOES KANTIAN ETHICS LEAVE US DEFENCELESS?
MORAL REQUIREMENTS AS REQUIREMENTS OF RATIONALITY
THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
UNIVERSAL LAW
CRITICISMS OF THE UNIVERSAL LAW PROCEDURE
CONCLUSION
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
FURTHER READING
NOTE
contents
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contents
6 Aristotelian virtue ethics
MOTIVATIONS FOR VIRTUE ETHICS
VIRTUE ETHICS: BASIC IDEAS
THE HUMAN FUNCTION AND THE GOOD HUMAN BEING
THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN AND THE RATIONALITY OF THE PASSIONS
VIRTUE ETHICS AND EGOISM
CONCLUSION
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
FURTHER READING
NOTES
PART III: FURTHER DIRECTIONS FOR MORAL THINKING
7 Ethics and religion
DOES ETHICS NEED RELIGION?
WHAT PROOF DO WE HAVE OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD?
THE EUTHYPHRO PROBLEM
ORTHODOXY, REVELATION AND INTERPRETATION
CONCLUSION
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
FURTHER READING
NOTES
8 Morality as contract
HOBBES: MORALITY AS RATIONAL SELF-INTEREST
PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM
HOBBES AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF MORALITY
THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM
THE FAIR PLAY SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY
KANTIAN CONTRACTUALISM
CONCLUSION
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
FURTHER READING
NOTES
9 Critiques of morality
MARX ON MORALITY
THE NIETZSCHEAN CRITIQUE
WHAT SHOULD WE THINK OF MARX AND NIETZSCHE?
MORALITY AND PROJECTION
CAN MORALITY SURVIVE CRITIQUE?
CONCLUSION
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contents
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
FURTHER READING
NOTE
10 So, this thing called ethics what kind of thing is it?
INTRODUCTION
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM WITH THE WHOLE IDEA OF MORALITY?
MORALITY AND THE CHALLENGE FROM SCIENCE
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OBJECTIVELY PRESCRIPTIVE AND MOTIVATIONALLY EFFECTIVE: HOW MORALITY
WOULD LIKE TO SEE ITSELF
IS MORALITY NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN WHY HUMAN BEINGS ACT AS THEY DO?
MACKIE ON THE TWO MAIN ARGUMENTS AGAINST MORALITYS SELF-IMAGE
RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE: TWO STRATEGIES
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
CONCLUSION
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
FURTHER READING
NOTES
Conclusion
Glossary of terms
Index
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PRE F A C E TO THE S E C O ND E DI TION
I am very pleased to have had the opportunity to prepare a second edition of this
book, and I hope this new edition continues to help students and general readers get
to grips with the theoretical understanding of ethical life. I would like to thank
numerous readers who commented on the strengths and weaknesses of the first
edition, and who made suggestions for improvement. I have not been able to act on
all of these suggestions, but I have been very grateful for the engagement.
In this edition I have broadened the scope of the survey of ethics by including a
chapter on meta-ethics, that is, the study of the kind of thing that morality is. This
is now Chapter 10, in the Further Directions for Moral Thinking section a good
topic for reflection, I think, once one has a firm grasp of the kinds of things morality
deals with and the substantive claims that are made for it. The questions considered
in this chapter in particular the issues of moralitys alleged objectivity or relativity, and its compatibility with the outlook of modern science are perennial
questions in contemporary public (and private) thinking about morality, and hence
it seemed a very helpful addition to the book to include a survey of these debates. In
addition to refreshing the material throughout the book, I have also added case
studies for almost every chapter exemplifying and extending the material being
discussed by bringing it to bear on real-life cases and decisions. These case studies
can provide discussion in their own right; but can also show how reflective moral
theorising and the intricacies of ethical decision-making in everyday life can and
should illuminate one another.
AC K NO W LE D G E ME NTS
I would like to thank Tony Bruce at Routledge for initially suggesting that I should
write this book, and for his help and advice about its contents. I have also been helped
by generous comments from a number of reviewers. For discussions of the first edition,
I would like to thank Brenda Watson and Jan Kandiyali. I am also very grateful to
Michael Bennett and Stephen Bennett for reading the manuscript and offering invaluable comments. In addition I would like to thank Gemma Dunn (formerly at Routledge), Katy Hamilton, Jim Thomas, Emma Joyes and Adam Johnson for their help in
preparing the book. The usual thanks must go to Sue, Sarah and Lois for their patience
with me while I have been writing this book. Perhaps most importantly, however, I
would like to thank those students with whom I have discussed these issues in my
courses on ethics over the years.
INTRODUCTION
WHAT IS MORAL THINKING?
No one who reads this book will be inexperienced in ethical thinking. People spend
their lives talking and thinking about what to do, what to think, how to react. Sometimes ethics is treated as a bit of a specialised subject: for instance, where an ethics
expert is brought in to give their perspective, say on a news story about the permissibility of some controversial medical research, once experts in various other fields
have had their say. But, necessary though this division of labour sometimes is, it can
encourage the view that ethics is something separate from the ordinary conditions of
life. One of the things I want to do in this introductory chapter is to convince the
reader that this view of ethics as a separate, rather unworldly, specialism is misguided.
We think ethically all of the time, because the fabric of our lives relationships,
ambitions, projects, responsibilities, wants and needs is constructed out of ethical
materials. In any one day I might agonise over (maybe this is too strong, but you get
the idea) whether it is wrong to be jealous of my friends greater abilities, how to
react to a perceived slight or lack of attention from my partner, whether to get
involved in local politics, how far to intervene in my childrens lives, or how much
intervention to tolerate from my own parents. Sometimes we are bad at making these
questions explicit; yet we feel their pressure, and they influence our behaviour even
when more felt than consciously deliberated on. And sometimes we discuss these
issues at length with our friends and colleagues in the office, at home, at the gym, in
cafés, bars, over dinner or lunch in short, whenever we get the chance.
Ethical issues seem quite personal and intimate, and one person can easily offend
another by acting in a way that the other thinks is wrong, or even by suggesting that
the others views are wrong. Our ethical views can be deeply held, bound up with our
feelings and emotions. Another way in which ethical issues can seem quite personal is
that it seems that each person ought to decide for herself what she is to think. We
would think it strange if someone thought it was enough to take up some ethical view
just because that is what their parents thought, or what their friends thought. We
would also think it strange if someone thought that they had the right to tell other
people what to think. Rather we tend to think that ethical views are personal in the
sense that each person should make up their own mind. (This doesnt mean that it
cant be the same as others, it just shouldnt be copied from others.) At the same time,
xii
what is ethics?
however, the fact that we spend time worrying about what the right thing to do is
suggests that we think that we might get it wrong. In which case, though ethical issues
seem to be in some ways a personal matter that each person should decide for himself,
it is not as if this means that it doesnt matter what view we take up. We feel bad if
we have done something that we later come to think was wrong. Furthermore, we
often take it that, where two people disagree, they cannot both be right. But this
suggests that, for many questions, we think that there is such a thing as a right answer
that we could discover. So ethics is both personal and impersonal, something on
which we have to decide for ourselves and to which we commit ourselves, but on the
other hand something where we are trying to get the right answer (or at any rate, avoid
the wrong answers).
WHAT IS MORAL THEORY?
Moral philosophy the study of ethics starts when we take seriously the need to
get our ethical views right. If we thought that a persons morality was nothing more
than whatever he or she feels strongly about then we would have no need of a discipline to investigate answers to moral questions since if morality was only a
personal matter there would be no such things as answers (or each persons answer
would be right for them, which would amount to the same thing). People sometimes say that morality is subjective, and think that proper arguments have come
to an end when we start making value judgements. We will have a look at this
viewpoint in more detail a bit later on. But while this view might be attractive in
theory it is very hard to maintain in practice. When we are confronted with the
situation of having to decide whether to have an abortion, or whether to apologise
to your friend for sleeping with her boyfriend, or whether to take a marketing job
for the nuclear power industry, we are suddenly thrown back into looking for the
right answers again.
WHAT MAKES FOR AN ARGUMENT IN PHILOSOPHY?
Arguments set out the reasons we have for believing something. They make
claims about what we ought to believe, how we ought to act, how we ought to
feel, and so on. Arguments are good when they give us good reason to believe
something, and bad when they fail to give us good reason. Arguments can
usefully be set out as a series of statements for instance, Since it would be
wrong to eat people, and animals are no different from people, it is wrong to eat
animals. That makes it easier to scrutinise each element of the claim being
made, and to judge whether the argument is good or bad. Arguments can be
analysed into premises and conclusion: the premises are the points that
support, lead to or provide evidence for the conclusion (the way the preceding
reasons in our example are meant to support the claim that it is wrong to eat
introduction
xiii
animals). Arguments can be attacked by questioning the truth of the premises
(in our example, by asking Is it wrong to eat people? or Are animals no
different from people?) or by questioning whether the conclusion follows from
the premises (that is, whether the truth of the premises guarantees, or at any
rate provides strong support for, the conclusion). There are many different
argument patterns. For instance, when an argument is deductively valid then the
truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. Inductive arguments, on the other hand, look at whether past experience makes it likely that
we can say what will happen in the future. Another form of argument is
inference to the best explanation. In this form, the evidence for our conclusions
may not guarantee the truth of that conclusion, but the conclusion may yet be
our best bet until we have an alternative explanation that supersedes it. Moral
arguments often rely on analogies, where a new situation is claimed to be sufficiently close, in relevant respects, to a more familiar situation whose moral
value we already know (e.g. animals are no different in relevant respects
from humans).
I have stressed that ethical thinking goes on all the time. And in general people are
very proficient at it. We navigate complex ethical situations with varying degrees of
success. What are the similarities and differences between this informal, often inarticulate, though often very sophisticated ethical thinking and moral philosophy?
The first thing about moral philosophy is that it is an attempt to make ethical issues
fully explicit. What often remains inarticulate, a matter of intuition, feeling, or gut
reaction, in ordinary ethical discourse, moral philosophers try to express clearly and
put into an explicit argument. The practical benefit of this is that it is only when we
have made our views explicit that we can be fully in control of them. That is, only
once we have articulated them can we then put them up for discussion, reflecting on
them, assessing them, deciding whether that is what we really ought to believe.
Therefore attempting to explain what our views are, and defending them, is an
essential part of ensuring that our views are the right ones. The second thing about
moral philosophy is that it tries to be more comprehensive than ordinary moral
thinking. Any individual will have some moral views, but they are more likely to have
moral views on matters that impinge on them directly. But of course this would not
lead to a comprehensive morality in which every aspect of every moral question
would be covered. However, this is the ambition of moral philosophy: to construct a
moral theory that will explain in a systematic and consistent way what the right thing
to do is in any situation. The practical benefit of this would be, of course, that there
are many moral issues on which any one individual doesnt know what to do, or on
which there is perhaps disagreement about what ought to be done. If there was a
comprehensive moral theory, then in place of this uncertainty we would have a clear
guide to action.
xiv
what is ethics?
WHY DO WE NEED MORAL THEORY?
It is sometimes said that human beings need ethics because we have freedom. Unlike
animals, human beings do not just act out of instinct. True, we have habits, customs
and gut reactions. And often perhaps unavoidably these are the things that prompt
us to act. But thats not all there is to human beings. Rather we can stop and ask
ourselves whether what we are doing is really what we ought to be doing. We can ask
for a justification. Are we just doing it because we want to? Or because everyone else
is doing it? Or is it also the right thing to do? In the study of ethics we take this
perspective of standing back from our habits and gut reactions to ask what to do,
what goals to pursue, what ideals to aspire to, and also what to avoid.
Another way of thinking about why human beings need ethics is to say that ethics
starts, not with the individual trying to decide for herself, but rather from the need to
justify or explain ourselves to others. Human beings are accountable to one another in
the sense that they continually ask one another why they acted in such and such a
way, particularly when the action was unusual or unexpected or brought about significant consequences. One deep human motivation is to act in a way that is defensible
before our peers that we can stand up and be counted for our actions. We want to
know that we have not acted in a way that we would be ashamed to confess to. Ethics
is the study of what actions really can be defended under scrutiny.
Now this might all sound very grand, but it might also sound a bit arrogant, as though
philosophers think that the common people are ignorant until they have been
provided with an ethical…
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