Distributive Justice Equity and Equality Reflection Paper write a 500 word reflection of how the concepts learned in this reading apply to your daily life

Distributive Justice Equity and Equality Reflection Paper write a 500 word reflection of how the concepts learned in this reading apply to your daily life or a current political event, or a feature of their cultural background. don’t waste words on a summary, make the entire thing purely a reflection. ANNUAL
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1983 by Annual Reviews Inc. All rights reserved
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE,
EQUITY, AND EQUALITY
Karen S. Cook and Karen A. Hegtvedt
Department of Sociology, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195
Abstract
This chapter provides a general review of the research conducted over the past
two decades on individuals’ conceptions of equity and distributive justice and
their reactions to inequity. Various theoretical formulations are identified and
important topics for further theoretical development and empirical investiga­
tion are discussed. In conclusion, the authors suggest that micro-level concepts
of distributive justice have certain limitations. Consideration of more macro­
level concepts suggests possibilities for integrating equity and distributive
justice theories with sociological theories of power, conflict, and collective
action. This integration, if achieved, would bring notions of justice to the
forefront in the analysis of social change.
INTRODUCTION
During a recent flight the first author of this chapter was interrupted by the male
passenger on her right with the predictable question, “What are you working
on?” The reply : “I’m writing an article on justic e ” To which the businessman
.
emphatically responded, “There is no justice!” If that were indeed the case,
there would be no need for this review chapter. But justice has been a topic of
interest to social scientists and philosophers for decades. If properly indexed,
the amount of material written on this subject would more than likely fill
several rooms. Thus we must limit scope.
Here, we focus upon the specific research tradition identified in the early
1960s as “distributive justice” (Homans 1961) or “equity theory” (Adams
1965). This pragmatic decision does not reflect on the merits of relevant
material published in philosophy and other social sciences excluded from
217
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218
COOK & HEGTVEDT
consideration here. What we omit in detail can be obtained by reading several
recent collections (see Berkowitz & Walster 1976; Mikula 1980a; Lerner &
Lerner 1981; Greenberg & Cohen 1982; Messick & Cook 1983).
All social systems evolve mechanisms for distributing valued resources and
for allocating rights, responsibilities, costs, and burdens. Theories of distribu­
tive justice specify the conditions under which particular distributions (and,
more recently, distributional procedures) are perceived to be “just” or “fair.” In
this chapter we describe various conceptions of justice commonly found in the
social science literature and review the research that has been conducted on
individuals’ allocation preferences and their reactions to inequitable alloca­
tions. In the concluding section we move beyond “micro” conceptions of
justice to more “macro” justice concerns.
CONCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE
Distinct types of justice principles can be identified in the social science
literature. We first distinguish between equity and distributive justice. The
former involves notions of exchange and the latter concerns general fairness in
allocation situations. The terms denote distinct types of justice. In concluding
this section we use Eckhoff’s ( 1974) five principles of equality to indicate how
most existing conceptions of justice fit within a more general theoretical
framework. We use the terms “justice principles” and “distribution rules”
interchangeably; different distribution rules are codifications of different
underlying principles of justice.
Equity: Fair Exchange
It is commonplace in social psychology to conceive of distributive justice or
equity as issues that arise whenever two or more persons exchange valued
resources, be they goods, services, money, love, or affection. This concept has
its roots in early exchange theoretic formulations proposed by Adams ( 1965),
Romans ( 1961), and Blau ( 1964). Exchanges between actors involve the
mutually beneficial transfer of valued resources. In the simplest case involving
two actors (A and B) engaged in the exchange of two valued resources (x and
y), the resource A provides (e:g. x) is both actor A’s input to the exchange and
actor B’s outcome; the resource B provides (e.g y) is B’s input and A’s outcome
(see Cook & Emerson 1978).
Within the exchange framework, equity is typically defined as the equiva­
lence of the outcome/input ratios (Adams 1965; Walster et al. 1973) of all
parties involved in the exchange. When these ratios are not equal, inequity is
said to exist. This “ratio” concept is the most commonly cited definition of
equity despite considerable debate over the “proper” equity formula (see Harris
1976; Moschetti 1979; Alessio 1980). Recent evidence even suggests that a
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
219
linear model is more appropriate than the ratio model for re presen ting indi­
viduals’ equity judgments (Harris 1980, 1983).
Distributive Justice: Fair Allocation
While many social situations can be conceived in exch ange terms, that
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framework does not encompass all situations in which justice is a concern.
Eckhoff ( 1974) makes a useful distinction between the mutu ally beneficial,
l
two-way transfer of valued resources (i. e. exchange as reci pr oc ati on) and the
one-way distribution of resources across a category or “circle” of recipients
{i.e. allocation).2
For our purposes, allocation occurs when an allocator distributes valued
rewards, resources, rights, obligations, etc.,
3
to an array of recipients.
Whether the recipients are involved in a direct exchange relation with the
distributor or indirectly with each other is a secondary analytical distinction.
Futhermore, in many situations exchange and allocation processes combine
(Eckhoff 1974).
4
Procedural Justice: Fair Procedures
Participants in exchange and allocation also evaluate the fairness of the
mechanisms or procedures involved. This general topic, only recently
researched, has been called “procedural justice” (see Thibaut
& Walker 1975;
Leventhal et al 1980).
Despite what might be perceived as a fair or just distribution of outcomes, the
procedures by which the distribution was arrived at may be defined as unjust or
illegitimate. Conversely, what participants consider a fair and unbaised proce­
dure (e.g. drawing lots) might nevertheless result in a distribution of outcomes
that some would define as inequitable or unjust. Thus distributive justice and
procedural justice represent distinct types of justice judgments.
I Eckhoff
distinguishes several types of reciprocity involving the transfer of (a) two negatively
, ) ; (b) a positively valued resource followed by a negatively valued one
(+, – ) ; (c) a negatively valued resource followed by 3 positively valued one (- , +); and (d) two
positively valued resources (+, +). The transfer of positively valued resources (+, +) is identified
value resources (
–
–
as exchange.
2Allocation situations are sometimes conceived as instances of “indirect” exchange (see Blalock
and Wilken 1979).
3The distribution of negatively valued outcomes like punis hment, liabilities, or fines is distinct
from the allocation of positively valued resources and is discussed more fully in the section on
Retributive Justice, below.
40ther investigators (e.g. Cohen 1979; Leventhal et al 1980) stress the distinction between
exchange and allocation. Cohen (1979), for example, distinguishes between (a) individual deserv­
ing, which focuses on levels of deserving derived from the comparison of exchange ratios, and (b)
distributive justice, which consists of principles governing allocations and the evaluation of
existing distributions.
220
COOK & HEGTVEDT
Retributive Justice: Just Compensation
Finally, in what is often conceived as an entirely separate set of social situa­
tions, actors are sometimes concerned with the fairness of the allocation of
punishments (i.e. does the punishment fit the crime?) or of the level of
compensation for victimization (e.g. victim compensation laws, affirmative
action policies, and the like; see Macaulay & Walster 1971; Blackstone &
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Heslep 1977). Despite Hogan & Emler’s (1981) recent claim that retribution,
not distribution, is the most fundamental principle of social life, only recently
have equity/justice theorists begun to explore this class of concerns empirically
(e.g. Austin et al 1976; Hamilton & Rytina 1980). According to Hogan &
Emler (1981:130), although “justice…always contains a positive and a nega­
tive side, as reflected in the terms distributive justice and retributive justice,
psychologists have focused almost exclusively on the positive side-on allocat­
ing and exchanging benefits on a just basis.”
Justice: Principles of Equality
A general approach to justice that easily incorporates equity and distributive
justice, and that provides indirectly for procedural and retributive justice, is the
concept of multiple justice principles or distribution rules. While many social
scientists (e.g. Rescher 1966; Deutsch 1975; Leventhal 1976a,b) have advo­
cated this approach, perhaps the most sytematiC effort is that of Eckhoff (1974).
He identifies five distinct principles of equality that are applied during alloca­
tion.
5
(Exchange can be defined as a special class of allocation in which the
distribution mechanism is the two-way transfer of mutual benefit.) Table 1
presents Eckhoff’s classification of justice principles.
Within this framework most distribution rules can be conceived as equality
principles. The “equality rule” traditionally referred to in the justice literature
(Le. equal amounts to each recipient) Eckhoff calls
“objective equal ity. The
”
“equity rule,” also labeled the “contributions rule” (i.e. equality of outcome/
input ratios or equality relative to individual contributions), 6 is Eckhoff’s
principle of “relative equality.” The “needs rule” (Schwartz 1975, 1977) (i.e.
equality of outcomes taking into account need andlor desert) is classified by
Eckhoff as a principle of “subjective equality.”
The principle of rank order equality is found in Homans’ earlier work
(1958:604): “If the costs or investments of the members of one group are higher
than those of another, distributive justice requires that their rewards should be
higher, too.” He refers to this as a condition of equilibrium because it is a
SPhilosophical statements that justice is not the same as equality (e.g. Lucas 1980) do not
completely contradict Eckhoff’s position. These philosophical statements generally refer to objec­
tively equal amounts, only one of the equality principles identified by Eckhoff.
6In research comparing objective and relative equality these two principles are typically labeled
the equality and contributions rules. respectively (see Leventhal 1976a.b; Schwinger 1980).
221
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Table 1
Principles of equality applied to allocation
Relevant characteristics of recipients
What is
to be equal
Need
Fitness
Desert
Status
Position
None
I. Equal amounts
to each
x
(objective equality)
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2. Subjective
equality
x
x
3. Relative
equality
x
(equity)
x
4. Rank order
equality
x
x
S. Equal
opportunity
x
x
x
condition of “felt justice,,7 (see Cook & Parcel 1977). This concept is also the
basis for Berger et aI’s (1972, 1983) status-value theory of distributive justice,
which fonnulates the problem in status-consistency tenns. Nonnative expecta­
tions emerge in status situations concerning the proper or just allocation of
rewards. Problems of distributive injustice arise in such situations when the
actual allocation of rewards is not “in line with” these nonnative expectations.
Equality of opportunity, the fifth principle identified by Eckhoff, is a
complex conception of justice difficult to apply. This difficulty derives in part
from the inherent complexity of the term “opportunity” and of the historical
antecedents of inequality. Many issues of distributive justice have arisen in the
context of affinnative action and racial integration policies8 and thus overlap
with notions of retributive or compensatory justice.
Eckhoff’s typology enables us to classify justice principles into two broad
categories: (a) those that depend upon the characteristics of recipients (Table 1,
principles 2, 3, and 4) and (b) those that do not (principles 1 and 5). Recently,
Brickman et al (1981) have made a similar distinction. Brickman classifies the
principles that depend upon recipients’ characteristics as “microjustice” prin­
ciples; those that specify the nature of the outcome distribution without refer­
ence to recipients’ characteristics are classified as “macrojustice” principles.9
7He also refers to this as a condition of “status congruence.” Concerning the relationship
between distributive justice and status congruence Homans (1974:246) concludes. “Perhaps there
are no pure cases of distributive justice; perhaps it always comes mixed with some status anxiety.”
8For example, Jencks (1972) concludes from his assessment of schooling opportunities in
America that equalizing one aspect of the education/occupation system is unlikely to have much
effect on the degree of inequality in other areas.
“More specifically, microjustice principles specify the correspondence between individual
characteristics and outcomes, indicating levels of individual desert; macrojustice principles refer
not to individuals but to the shape of the distribution of outcomes in some aggregate.
222
COOK & HEGTVEDT
Concluding Comment
The recent move away from earlier monistic formulations of justice (e.g.
Adams 1965) facilitates the analysis of more complex and interesting issues of
social justice and injustice. Not only might different distribution rules (and
concomitant conceptions of justice) apply under different conditions, but
various rules might be applied in combination (Leventhal 1976b) or sequential­
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ly to determine the ultimate just or fair distribution of a reward or resource
(Cook
will
& Yamagishi 1983). Further theoretical development along these lines
make
justice theory
and research applicable to a wider range of social
phenomena.
SITUATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL FACTORS
AFFECTING RULE PREFERENCE
Much of the research on equity and distributive justice over the past decade has
attempted to discover which principles are appropriate or preferred in various
social
situations.
This research generally has attempted to:
(a) specify the
appropriateness of particular distribution rules for achieving certain goals (e.g.
Leventhal 1976a,b; Leventhal et al 1980) and
(b) identify factors affecting
individual preferences for certain rules (see Schwinger 1980; Mikula 1980b).
Rule appropriateness and preferences are typically analyzed using data
obtained from either vignettes or interactions in laboratory settings.
Goals of Interaction: The Functions of Distribution Rules
The goals of interaction are important determinants of the selection of an
appropriate distribution rule (Leventhal 1976a,b). These investigations gener­
ally focus on three rules: contributions (or equity), need, and equality (i.e.
Eckhoff’S principles 1-3). When the goal is to facilitate and enhance productiv­
ity, the contributions rule is preferred (Porter
& Lawler 1968; Lawler 1971;
(a)
Leventhal 1976a,b). Deviations from the application of this rule may occur
when overrewarding lesser contributors is perceived as necessary to stimulate
their performance (Leventhal & Whiteside 1973; Greenberg & Leventhal 1976)
and
(b) when there is so much antagonism and rivalry among coworkers that
overrewarding the lesser contributors may prevent dissatisfaction and disrup­
tive behavior (Goode 1967; Lawler 1971; Steiner 1972).
While use of a contributions rule presumably facilitates productivity, the
actual assessment of productivity in experimental situations is rare. After
reviewing
24 studies, Miller & Hamblin (1963) found that the productivity
promoting function of the contributions rule was realized in only 14 of the
studies, typically under the condition of low task interdependence; results from
the remaining studies suggested that use of an equality rule was correlated with
higher productivity.
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
223
When concern for preserving harmony in a group is paramount, distributions
of equal amounts may be deemed appropriate in order to minimize perceived
relative deprivation and emphasize members’ “common fate” (Leventhal et al
1972; Steiner 1972; Smith & Cook 1973), thus promoting solidarity. Leventhal
& Michaels’ (see Leventhal et al 1980) research confirmed this prediction;
however, their findings also suggest that when sizeable differences in levels of
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performance exist among group members, subjects prefer using a distribution
rule that simultaneously rewards superior performance while keeping all mem­
bers satisfied enough to prevent strong negative feelings.
Finally the “needs” rule is often defined as appropriate when the well-being
of individuals is most salient (Schwartz 1975 , 1977) or when individuals’ needs
are perceived to be closely linked to group success (Leventhal 1976a,b).
Furthermore, scarcity contributes to the use of a needs rule; when the su pply of
a valued resource is low, both need for the resource and readiness or ability to
use it are taken into account in allocation decisions (Leventhal et al 1973b).
Leventhal et a1 (1980) have identified factors that seem to weaken perceived
appropriateness of the use of a needs rule in particular situations such as severe
scarcity, emotional detachment from the group, and belief that the use of a
needs rule perpetuates dependency.
,
Factors Influencing Distribution Rule Preference
Many influences upon individuals’ preferences for particular distribution rules
have been explored: (a) characteristics of the relationships among group
members; (b) cognitive mediating factors; (e) number of relevant inputs; and
(d) other personal and situational factors.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RELATIONSHIP
Research results indicate that
preferences for particular distribution rules vary based on factors typically
associated with interpersonal attraction processes such as similarity, proximity,
and degree of self-disclosure. Actors who perceive themselves as attitudinally
similar to one another are more likely to prefer equal distributions over
“equitable” ones (Greenberg 1978a). Proximity is usually assessed only in­
directly in empirical situations by varying the perceived probability of future
interaction. For example, Gre enber g (1979) and Shapiro (1975) report that
actors who anticipate future interaction generally prefer an equality rather than
an equity (contributions) rule. Where allocation decisions are made openly,
preference f…
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