San Jose City College Constructivist View of Bureaucracy Question Writer choice (Pick any one of the topic): Does constructivism complement, or critique, R

San Jose City College Constructivist View of Bureaucracy Question Writer choice (Pick any one of the topic): Does constructivism complement, or critique, Realist thought?Explain the constructivist view of bureaucracy. In your answer, mention how it differs from what liberal or realist would claim about bureaucracy.The new populism is a threat to liberal institutionalism.Agree or disagree with this statement.https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/03/08/the-rise-of-european-populism-and-the-collapse-of-the-center-left/I will upload sources to use, if you need more please feel free to ask Length: 3 Pages (NO MORE THAN 3 PAGES)
From the Syllabus: This assignment requires you to use themes from the readings and debate critically
the meaning, scope, and/or practices. Critique does not simply mean your opinion; it must be wellreasoned and backed up by reconstructing the arguments and ideas from the readings. You may be
surprised by the readings, think they are interesting, or incredibly boring. … In these shorter essays,
you are expected to make a strong argument about a specific week’s readings, and to support this
argument with theoretical and empirical evidence. External sources are not required for the short
papers. Your sources for these papers are class readings.
Paper Questions: Pick one, DON’T respond to all three
1. Does constructivism complement, or critique, Realist thought?
2. Explain the constructivist view of bureaucracy. In your answer, mention how it differs from
what liberal or realist would claim about bureaucracy.
3. The new populism is a threat to liberal institutionalism. Agree or disagree with this statement.
The end of liberal international order?
For seven decades the world has been dominated by a western liberal order. After
the Second World War, the United States and its partners built a multifaceted and
sprawling international order, organized around economic openness, multilateral
institutions, security cooperation and democratic solidarity. Along the way, the
United States became the ‘first citizen’ of this order, providing hegemonic leadership—anchoring the alliances, stabilizing the world economy, fostering cooperation and championing ‘free world’ values. Western Europe and Japan emerged as
key partners, tying their security and economic fortunes to this extended liberal
order. After the end of the Cold War, this order spread outwards. Countries in east
Asia, eastern Europe and Latin America made democratic transitions and became
integrated into the world economy. As the postwar order expanded, so too did its
governance institutions. NATO expanded, the WTO was launched and the G20
took centre stage. Looking at the world at the end of the twentieth century, one
could be excused for thinking that history was moving in a progressive and liberal
internationalist direction.
Today, this liberal international order is in crisis. For the first time since the
1930s, the United States has elected a president who is actively hostile to liberal
internationalism. Trade, alliances, international law, multilateralism, environment, torture and human rights—on all these issues, President Trump has made
statements that, if acted upon, would effectively bring to an end America’s role as
leader of the liberal world order. Simultaneously, Britain’s decision to leave the
EU, and a myriad other troubles besetting Europe, appear to mark an end to the
long postwar project of building a greater union. The uncertainties of Europe, as
the quiet bulwark of the wider liberal international order, have global significance.
Meanwhile, liberal democracy itself appears to be in retreat, as varieties of ‘new
authoritarianism’ rise to new salience in countries such as Hungary, Poland, the
Philippines and Turkey. Across the liberal democratic world, populist, nationalist
and xenophobic strands of backlash politics have proliferated.1
How deep is this crisis? It might simply be a temporary setback. With new
political leadership and renewed economic growth, the liberal order could bounce
1
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G. JOHN IKENBERRY
On the troubles of western liberal democracy, see Edward Luce, The retreat of western liberalism (New York:
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2017); Bill Emmott, The fate of the West: the battle to save the world’s most successful political
idea (New York: Public Affairs, 2017).
International Affairs 94: 1 (2018) 7–23; doi: 10.1093/ia/iix241
© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of International Affairs. All rights
reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
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See G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: the origins, crisis, and transformation of the American world order ­(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2011); Amitav Acharya, The end of American world order (Cambridge: Polity, 2014).
See Robert Kagan, The world America made (New York: Vintage, 2013). For recent views, see Ian Buruma, ‘The
end of the Anglo-American order’, New York Times Magazine, 29 Nov. 2016; Ulrich Speck, ‘The crisis of liberal
order’, The American Interest, 12 Sept. 2016; Michael J. Boyle, ‘The coming illiberal era’, Survival 58: 2, 2016,
pp. 35–66.
On the crisis of liberal modernity, see Pankaj Mishra, Age of anger: a history of the present (New York: Farrar,
Straus & Giroux, 2017).
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back. But most observers think there is something more fundamental going on.
Some observers see a crisis of American hegemonic leadership. For 70 years,
the liberal international order has been tied to American power—its economy,
currency, alliance system, leadership. Perhaps what we are witnessing is a ‘crisis
of transition’, whereby the old US-led political foundation of the liberal order
will give way to a new configuration of global power, new coalitions of states,
new governance institutions. This transition might be leading to some sort of
post-American and post-western order that remains relatively open and rulesbased.2 Others see a deeper crisis, one of liberal internationalism itself. In this
view, there is a long-term shift in the global system away from open trade, multilateralism and cooperative security. Global order is giving way to various mixtures
of nationalism, protectionism, spheres of influence and regional Great Power
projects. In effect, there is no liberal internationalism without American and
western hegemony—and that age is ending. Liberal internationalism is essentially
an artefact of the rapidly receding Anglo-American era.3 Finally, some go even
further than this, arguing that what is happening is that the long era of ‘liberal
modernity’ is ending. Beginning with the Enlightenment and running through
the industrial revolution and the rise of the West, world-historical change seemed
to be unfolding according to a deep developmental logic. It was a progressive
movement driven by reason, science, discovery, innovation, technology, learning,
constitutionalism and institutional adaptation. The world as a whole was in the
embrace of this global modernizing movement. Perhaps today’s crisis marks the
ending of the global trajectory of liberal modernity. It was an artefact of a specific
time and place—and the world is now moving on.4
No one can be sure how deep the crisis of liberal internationalism runs. In
what follows, I argue that, despite its troubles, liberal internationalism still has a
future. The American hegemonic organization of liberal order is weakening, but
the more general organizing ideas and impulses of liberal internationalism run
deep in world politics. What liberal internationalism offers is a vision of open and
loosely rules-based order. It is a tradition of order-building that emerged with the
rise and spread of liberal democracy, and its ideas and agendas have been shaped as
these countries have confronted and struggled with the grand forces of modernity.
Creating an international ‘space’ for liberal democracy, reconciling the dilemmas
of sovereignty and interdependence, seeking protections and preserving rights
within and between states—these are the underlying aims that have propelled
liberal internationalism through the ‘golden eras’ and ‘global catastrophes’ of the
last two centuries. Despite the upheavals and destruction of world war, economic
depression, and the rise and fall of fascism and totalitarianism, the liberal interna-
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tional project survived. It is likely to survive today’s crises as well. But to do so this
time, as it has done in the past, liberal internationalism will need to be rethought
and reinvented.
I make this argument in three steps. First, I offer a way of thinking about
liberal internationalism. It is not simply a creature of American hegemony. It is
a more general and longstanding set of ideas, principles and political agendas for
organizing and reforming international order. In the most general sense, liberal
internationalism is a way of thinking about and responding to modernity—its
opportunities and its dangers. What has united the ideas and agendas of liberal
internationalism is a vision of an open, loosely rules-based and progressively
oriented international order. Built on Enlightenment foundations, it emerged in
the nineteenth century with the rise in the West of liberalism, nationalism, the
industrial revolution, and the eras of British and American hegemony. A conviction has run through nineteenth- and twentieth-century liberal internationalists
that the western and—by extension—the global international order is capable of
reform. This separates liberal internationalism from various alternative ideologies
of global order—political realism, authoritarian nationalism, Social Darwinism,
revolutionary socialism and post-colonialism.
Second, I trace liberal internationalism’s crooked pathway into the twentyfirst century, as it evolved and reinvented itself along the way. In the nineteenth
century, liberal internationalism was seen in the movements towards free trade,
international law, collective security and the functional organization of the
western capitalist system. Along the way, liberal internationalism mixed and
intermingled with all the other major forces that have shaped the modern global
system—imperialism, nationalism, capitalism, and the shifting movements of
culture and civilization. In the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, it
moved through a sequence of golden eras, crises and turning points: Wilson and
the League of Nations; the post-Second World War Anglo-American settlement
and the building of the US-led postwar order; crises of capitalism and leadership
in the world economy; the post-Cold War American ‘unipolar’ moment and the
‘globalization’ of liberalism and neo-liberal ideas; debates about the Responsibility
to Protect (R2P) and liberal interventionism; and today’s crisis of the western
liberal order. Liberal internationalism came into its own as a political order during
the Cold War, under American auspices. American liberal hegemony was essentially a western order built around ‘free world’ social purposes.
Third, I identify the sources of the contemporary crisis of liberal internationalism. These can be traced to the end of the Cold War. It is important to recall that
the postwar liberal order was originally not a global order. It was built ‘inside’ one
half of the bipolar Cold War system. It was part of a larger geopolitical project
of waging a global Cold War. It was built around bargains, institutions and social
purposes that were tied to the West, American leadership and the global struggle
against Soviet communism. When the Cold War ended, this ‘inside’ order became
the ‘outside’ order. As the Soviet Union collapsed, the great rival of liberal internationalism fell away, and the American-led liberal order expanded outwards. With
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the end of the Cold War, liberal internationalism was globalized. Initially, this was
seen as a moment of triumph for western liberal democracies. But the globalization of the liberal order put in motion two shifts that later became the sources
of crisis. First, it upended the political foundations of the liberal order. With
new states entering the system, the old bargains and institutions that provided
the sources of stability and governance were overrun. A wider array of states—
with a more diverse set of ideologies and agendas—were now part of the order.
This triggered what might be called a ‘crisis of authority’, where new bargains,
roles and responsibilities were now required. These struggles over authority and
governance continue today. Second, the globalization of the liberal order also
led to a loss of capacity to function as a security community. This can be called
a ‘crisis of social purpose’. In its Cold War configuration, the liberal order was a
sort of full-service security community, reinforcing the capacity of western liberal
democracies to pursue policies of economic and social advancement and stability.
As liberal internationalism became the platform for the wider global order, this
sense of shared social purpose and security community eroded.
Taking all these elements together, this account of the crisis can be understood as a crisis of success, in the sense that the troubles besetting the liberal order
emerged from its post-Cold War triumph and expansion. Put differently, the
troubles today might be seen as a ‘Polanyi crisis’—growing turmoil and instability resulting from the rapid mobilization and spread of global capitalism,
market society and complex interdependence, all of which has overrun the political foundations that supported its birth and early development.5 They do not,
on the contrary, constitute what might be called an ‘E. H. Carr crisis’, wherein
liberal internationalism fails because of the return of Great Power politics and the
problems of anarchy.6 The troubles facing liberal internationalism are not driven
by a return of geopolitical conflict, although conflicts with China and Russia are
real and dangerous. In fact, the liberal international order has succeeded all too
well. It has helped usher in a world that has outgrown its political moorings.
Liberal internationalism has survived its 200-year journey into the current
century because, with liberal democracy at the core, it offered a coherent and
functional vision of how to organize international space. The industrial revolution and the relentless rise of economic and security interdependence generated
both opportunities and threats for liberal democracies. Liberal internationalism,
in all its varied configurations, has provided templates for cooperation in the face
of the grand forces of modernity. To do so again, the liberal international project
will need to rethink its vision. It will either need to offer a ‘small and thick’ vision
of liberal order, centred as it was during the Cold War on the western liberal
democracies; or it will need to offer a ‘large and thin’ version of liberal internationalism, with global principles and institutions for coping with the dangers
and vulnerabilities of twenty-first-century modernity—cascading problems of
Karl Polanyi, The great transformation: the political and economic origins of our times (Boston: Beacon, 1957).
E. H. Carr, The twenty years crisis, 1919–1939: an introduction to the study of international relations (London: Macmillan, 1951).
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The end of liberal international order?
environmental destruction, weapons of mass destruction, global health pandemics
and all the other threats to human civilization.
Liberal internationalism and world order
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See Michael Doyle, ‘Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs’, parts 1 and 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12:
1–2, 1983, pp. 205–35, 323–53.
John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution’, in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism matters: the theory and praxis of an institutional form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 11.
See Tim Dunne and Matt McDonald, ‘The politics of liberal internationalism’, International Politics 50: 1, Jan.
2013, pp. 1–17; Beate Jahn, Liberal internationalism: theory, history, practice (New York: Palgrave, 2013).
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When the nineteenth century began, liberal democracy was a new and fragile
political experiment, a political glimmering within a wider world of monarchy,
autocracy, empire and traditionalism. Two hundred years later, at the end of
the twentieth century, liberal democracies, led by the western Great Powers,
dominated the world—commanding 80 per cent of global GNP. Across these two
centuries, the industrial revolution unfolded, capitalism expanded its frontiers,
Europeans built far-flung empires, the modern nation-state took root, and along
the way the world witnessed what might be called the ‘liberal ascendancy’—the
rise in the size, number, power and wealth of liberal democracies.7 Liberal internationalism is the body of ideas and agendas with which these liberal democracies
have attempted to organize the world.
Liberal internationalism has risen and fallen and evolved. But its general logic
is captured in a cluster of five convictions. One concerns openness. Trade and
exchange are understood to be constituents of modern society, and the connections and gains that flow from deep engagement and integration foster peace and
political advancement. An open international order facilitates economic growth,
encourages the flow of knowledge and technology, and draws states together.
Second, there is a commitment to some sort of loosely rules-based set of relations.
Rule and institutions facilitate cooperation and create capacities for states to make
good on their domestic obligations. This is what John Ruggie describes as ‘multilateralism’—an institutional form that coordinates relations among a group of
states ‘on the basis of generalized principles of conduct’.8 Third, there is a view
that liberal international order will entail some form of security cooperation.
This does not necessarily mean alliances or a formal system of collective security,
but states within the order affiliate in ways designed to increase their security.
Fourth, liberal internationalism is built on the idea that international society is,
as Woodrow Wilson argued, ‘corrigible’. Reform is possible. Power politics can
be tamed—at least to some extent—and states can build stable relations around
the pursuit of mutual gains. Fifth and finally, there is an expectation that a liberal
international order will move states in a progressive direction, defined in terms of
liberal democracy. The order provides institutions, relationships, and rights and
protections that allow states to grow and advance at home. It is a sort of mutual
aid and protection society.9
Seen in this way, a liberal international order can take various forms. It can
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For a discussion of these various dimensions of liberal internationalism, see G. John Ikenberry, ‘Liberal internationalism 3.0: America and the dilemmas of liberal world order’, Perspectives on Politics 7: 1, March 2009, pp.
71–87.
For depictions of the theory and history of liberal internationalism, see Tony Smith, America’s mission: the
United States and the worldwide struggle for democracy (Princeton: Princeton Univ…
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