Big Dig Largest Highway Project in American History Presentation I want to re-edit the PowerPoint, add notes to talk at every slide up to 7 lines. Also, ad

Big Dig Largest Highway Project in American History Presentation I want to re-edit the PowerPoint, add notes to talk at every slide up to 7 lines. Also, adding introduction and conclusion.I want 2 questions with answers related to the topic.I am attaching the files. BIG DIG PROJECT
Analysis
WHAT IS THE BIG DIG PROJECT?
• The most challenging and largest highway project an American history
(Thalheimer, 2000)
• Also known as central artery/tunnel project
WHY WAS IT NECESSARY?
• The previous elevated central artery
(built in 1953) was deteriorated
causing huge traffic in Boston.
NB: the elevated six-lane central artery
(I-93), was meant to accommodate
75000 vehicles per day, however in a
typical day 200,000 vehicles a day
used the road.
HOW DID IT HAPPEN?
1970s- conception of idea
1982- project planning face kick-started
1983- environmental impact studies on the project began
1983- extensive lobbying of funds for the project began
1987- congress approved funding for the big dig project (Bradshaw & Baxter, 2006)
1987- president Ronald Reagan vetoed the bill in the same year since he felt that it
was too costly
1987- congress overrode the president’s veto
HOW DID IT HAPPEN?
1991- the ground was first broken
1997- state parliament created the
metropolitan highway system. The
responsibility of the tunnel “CA/T” and
the
central
artery
project was
transferred from both the office of
Massachusetts’ governor and the
Massachusetts highway department to
the Massachusetts turnpike authority
(MTA).
2007- the project was completed in
December at a cost of over $14.6 billion
WHY WAS IT A SUCCESS?
.
IDEA
DESIGN
MANAGEMENT
AUDIT
SUCCESS
EXTERNAL
AND INTERNAL
FACTOR
A. IDEA CONCEPTION
1. Talks between B oston transportation, business leaders and governm ent
• The Boston transportation planning review was first with the idea in the 1970s
(Harmon, 2008)
• The business leaders, however, proposed the construction of a third harbour
tunnel.
• The government chose to combine the two opinions
NB: Therefore, the big dig is an amalgamation of the ideas by the business leaders
and the city of Boston.
2.Joint venture
• Massachusetts turnpike authority (MTA) had very little experience in managing
such huge projects. For this reason, it employed a joint venture
• Aimed at:
1.
Tracking the schedule and cost of the project
2.
Advising MTA on its decisions regarding the project
3.
Act as the representative of MTA
B. DESIGN
1. Joint venture
• The overall design and construction of the project was provided by a joint
venture of Quade and Douglas, parsons Brinkerhoff, and Bechtel (Bradshaw &
Baxter, 2006)
2. Many internationally recognized subcontractors
• Some of the heavy contractors of the big dig project included Jay Cashman,
Perini corporation, modern continental and gannet Fleming Inc.
DESIGN
3. Involving some of the best-known design companies worldwide
• Quade and Douglas, Parsons Brinkerhoff, as well as Bechtel, are some of the
best engineering companies across the world.
4. Asymmetrical hybrid design
• Enabled the two Charles river bridges to accommodate ten lanes of the road
meaning even high traffic than which was anticipated
C. PROJECT MANAGEMENT
1. Joint venture work program s
• The state’s secretary of transport first assigned the entire responsibility for the
big dig project to the Massachusetts department of public works (MDPW)
• MDPW was required to employ an exceptionally capable as well as the
experienced contractor, who would become the project manager of the project
CONTINUATION
• Instead, MDPW entered into an agreement with a joint venture of three
companies, which included Quade & Douglas, Parsons Brinckerhoff, and Bechtel
• The use of these contracts helped MDPW to access the ability of the joint
venture to handle the whole project
• The commonwealth of Massachusetts retained the authority of making the actual
decisions while the joint venture took control of the substantial design and
construction of the project (Riad et al., 2004)
2. Project financial management under one authority
• All the funding of the project had to go through MHD
• Accountability in the management of the project’s funds was ensured
D. AUDITS
• Several principal independent reviewers were engaged in reviewing the
project’s management as well as organizational structure, effectiveness, and
efficiency, cost savings in addition to the change-order process
• These are: FHWA, inspector general and the Massachusetts state auditor, and the
U.S. General accounting office (GAO)
E. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL FACTORS
1. Economic and business aspect
• The initial idea of the project according to the Boston transportation planning review
was the replacement of the existing rusting elevated six-lane central artery.
•
However, the business leaders were concerned about opening access to Logan
airport. They proposed the construction of a third harbour tunnel (riad et al., 2004).
• In the end, the government chose to combine the two opinions-the opinion of the
business leaders and that of the city of Boston. This business aspect changed the
engineering design of the project.
2. How managers used system engineering processes to account for
these issues
• The project managers avoided possible project failure by ensuring that all the
preceding phases of the project were completed successfully before starting a
new phase.
FAILURES OF THE PROJECT
1. Leaks
• According to Bradshaw & Baxter (2006), as of 2001, the officials and contractors
of turnpike authority established thousands of leaks in both the wall fissures and
ceiling of the project. The authority established that the project had overloaded
drainage systems
2. Use of substandard materials
• In 2005, Massachusetts state police established that the concrete that was
delivered for the construction of the underground portions of the project was
substandard.
• The state of Massachusetts filed in excess of 200 complaints as a result of leaks,
quality concerns, safety violations as well as cost overruns.
REFERENCES
Bradshaw, A. S., & Baxter, C. D. (2006). Design and construction of driven pile
foundations–lessons learned on the central artery/tunnel project (no. Fhwa-hrt-05159). Turner-fairbank highway research centre.
Harmon, k. M. (2008). Case study as to the effectiveness of dispute review boards on
the central artery/tunnel project. Journal of legal affairs and dispute resolution in
engineering and construction, 1(1), 18-31.
Riad, h. L., Ricci, A. L., Osborn, P. W., D’Angelo, D. A., & Horvath, J. S. (2004). Design of
lightweight fills for road embankments on Boston’s central artery/tunnel project.
Thalheimer, e. (2000). Construction noise control program and mitigation strategy
at the central artery/tunnel project. Noise control engineering journal, 48(5), 157165.

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