POLS 490 Nuclear Weapons I have to write 3-5 pages research question. I have written one page so far but I will need someone to write the rest and make cha
POLS 490 Nuclear Weapons I have to write 3-5 pages research question. I have written one page so far but I will need someone to write the rest and make changes it if needed in what i have written.
I will be attaching the articles below : 1- Denuclearization in Argentina and Brazil. 2- Middle East Denuclearization? Lessons from Latin America’s Southern Cone. 3- Anatomizing Pakistan’s Motivations for Nuclear Weapons. + plus the what i have wrote so far.
THIS NEEDS TO BE DONE IN 7 HOURS. Arms Control Association
Denuclearization in Argentina and Brazil
Author(s): Jose Goldemberg and Harold A. Feiveson
Source: Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 2, LATIN AMERICA SPECIAL ISSUE (March 1994),
pp. 10-14
Published by: Arms Control Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23625089
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Denuclearization
Denuclearizatio
in Argentina and Brazil
Jose
Jose
Goldemberg and
Goldemberg
Harold A. Feiveson
and
Har
important agreements reached be- agreements. The entry into force of the
The tween
politicalArgentina
process that
led to the addressed by the more recent bilateral
and Brazil to “The decisions by treaty required
guarantee that nuclear energy is used in . . , _ tries to ratify it.
all Latin
bothe countries exclusively for peaceful /xYgCnTinu ClflCl DYClZll Most of the coun
purposes could prove to be a useful model. to fOYPO the have not only signed and
These achievements are due primarily to * r r but also have waived the unanimity re
the return of democratic rule in both coun- pYOullCtlOYl OJ MlClCO-Y quirement and consider the treaty in forc
tries. While the political processes leading WCOVOnS is closclll However, the fact that Argentina and
to fully integrated democratic institutions ‘ ” signed but did not ratify it throughout
may not have taken hold as fully in other linked to the YetuYn of 1970s and 1980s fueled international s
regions of proliferation concern, the Argen- dcmOCYtttic Ytile in cions for over two decades that they
tine-Brazilian agreements suggest that developing nuclear weapon production
similar regional safeguards arrangements both COUntYieS ClftBY programs
might be possible in South Asia, on the , j r The declaration of November 28,1990,
Korean Peninsula eventually, and perhaps UBCttUCS OJ ntlLlTPlYy therefore, was
in portions of the Middle East. %OVeYntnentSstatement of principle, it unequivocally
These agreements include the creation committed the two countries to use nuclear
of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Ac- energy exclusively for peaceful purposes,
counting and Control of Nuclear Materials and with its system of inspections it sig
(ABACC) for the application of safeguards agreement based on the SCCC. In addition, nailed an end to all need
to both countries; and the Quadripartite the presidents decided “to adopt. . . after concern.
Agreement between Brazil, Argentina, the the safeguards agreement with the IAEA is In practical terms, it s
International Atomic Energy Agency concluded . . . pertinent measures leading for the subsequent A
(IAEA) and ABACC. to the full entry into force for both countries Exclusively Peaceful Uses
of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear ergy” (the so-called “Bilat
Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of ment”),1 which has been ratifie
The Agreements Tlatelolco), including action aimed at up- Congresses of both countries; the estab
dating and improving its text.” lishment of the ABACC to administer and
On November 28,1990, the presidents On January 18, 1994, Argentina and implement the SCCC; and the Quadripar
of Argentina and Brazil signed, at Foz do Chile deposited their instruments of ratifi- tite Agreement. In July 1992 ABACC
Iguacu, at the border between the two cation to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, leaving started its activities, and in September 1992
countries, a “Declaration on the Common only Brazil (which has signed the treaty) agency inspectors conducted their first
Nuclear Policy of Brazil and Argentina” and Cuba (which has not) the only major verification inspections.
(see box, p.ll). The key decisions taken in countries in Latin America that have not ABACC has 50 inspectors (25 of each
this declaration were to establish a Com- ratified so far. nationality who inspect facilities in the
mon System of Accounting and Control of The Tlatelolco Treaty, which was other country). These inspectors gener
Nuclear Materials (SCCC) to verify that nu- promulgated in 1967 (preceding the nu- have had previous experience in
clear materials in all nuclear activities of clear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by guards implementation or are specia
both parties are used exclusively for peace- one year), had as its main objective the on different types of nuclear installa
ful purposes, and to start negotiations with establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free They are not part of a permanent staff bu
the IAEA for the conclusion of a safeguards zone (NWFZ) in Latin America. Aside from can be hired as consultants whenever th
prohibiting the acquisition of nuclear are needed.
Jose Goldemberg, professor of physics at Sao weapons, it required the signatories to ac- As a follow-up to the Foz do I
Paulo University and a 1993-94 visiting fellow cept IAEA safeguards through bilateral or declaration, the governments of Arge
at Princeton University’s Center for Energy multilateral agreements. and Brazil requested the director gener
and Environmental Studies, was minister for The Tlatelolco Treaty did have one sig- the IAEA to arrange for the negotiation o
science and technology when most of the denu- nificant weakness: it permitted the use or the quadripartite safeguards agreement
clearization activities described in this article building of nuclear explosives for “peace- tween Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and th
took place in Brazil. Harold A. Feiveson is a ful purposes” such as digging harbors and IAEA covering nuclear materials in all nu
senior research scientist at the Center. sea channels, a drawback that has been clear activities within their territories, un
10
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1994
der their jurisdiction or carried out under multinational EURATOM system extensive for other regions. The presence of both
their control anywhere.2 The agreement (in safeguards responsibilities that obviated presidents at the agreement-signing cere
Article 13) allows for the possibility of de- the need to establish their own States Sys- mony at IAEA headquarters in Viennaan
veloping nuclear-powered submarinesa terns of Accounting for and Control of Nu- unprecedented eventwas a clear sign of
concession considered particularly impor- clear Materials, which would otherwise be the importance both countries attached to
tant by Brazil.3 required under the NPT. the agreement.
The draft Quadripartite Agreement The advantage of this delegation of After the signing ceremo
and its protocol comprise a comprehensive responsibilities is that “self-verification” by ment was submitted for rat
safeguards arrangement for exporting and national authorities is replaced by a system Congresses of Argentina and
importing nuclear material and specifies that is not subjected to the orders of the approved swiftly by the
arrangements for cooperation in the appli- authorities of a single state but is instead gress, but in the Brazilian Con
cation of safeguards, thus putting into prac- based on the idea that “neighbours are with some opposition inspired b
tice Article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco watching neighbours.”4 political groups that in the pas
regarding the application of IAEA safe- On the other hand, the agreement (in aged the development of a
guards. Article 8) was designed to avoid unneces- weapons program.
The protocol to the draft agreement is sary intrusion by inspectors into Argentina Despite this opp
quite similar to the safeguards agreements and Brazil’s sensitive nuclear facilities, thus house, the Chamber o
concluded between the member states of preserving the technological developments the safeguards agree
the European Union, the European Atomic they have achieved independently. in September 1993; no
Energy Community (EURATOM) and the The agreement with the IAEA was dis- fication are expected
IAEA. EURATOM, an agency of the Euro- cussed and approved at the agency’s Board The Quadrip
pean Union, is responsible for most inspec- of Governors meeting November 5-6,1991, tween Argentina
tions of nuclear facilities in the member where it was characterized by all board the IAEA, when fu
countries, subject to quality control and members as an important development in combined with the Treaty
oversight by the IAEA. Through the EURA- terms of strengthening the international lead to a complete and
TOM treaty, member states delegated to the safeguards system and as a possible model of denuclearization of
Declaration on the Common Nuclear Policy
The President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Dr. Fer- nisms for the nuclear activities of both countri
nando Collor, and the President of the Argentine Republic, Dr. among others, common criteria for the clas
Carlos Saul Menem, gathered in Foz do Iguacu, Brazil. materials and facilities as well as for the deter
relevance, and which foresee reciprocal inspections for all th
Considering: nuclear facilities,
their decision to strengthen the ongoing process of inte- D
gration; the importance of the utilization of nuclear energy ex- 1. T
dusively for peaceful purposes, for the scientific, economic and (SCC
social development of both countries; apply in all nuclear activities of both countries.
the commitments arising from the Joint Declaration on 2. to establish that the following activities shall be carried
Nuclear Policy of Foz do Iguacu (1985), Brasilia (1966), Viedma out within the next 45 days, as a first stage:
(1967), Ipero (1988) and Ezeiza (1988); a. the exchange of respective descriptive lists of all nuclear
the reaffirmation of these commitments by both Presi- facilities;
dents, included in the Buenos Aires Joint Communique of July b. the exchange of the declarations on the initial inventories
6,1990;
of
nuclear
materials;
the progress achieved in their bilateral nuclear c
tion, as a result of the joint endeavors under the fr
the
Agreement
on
Cooperation
in
the
Peaceful
Energy; Agency of the register and reporting system which is part of the
Stressing: Common Accounting and Control System, with a view to har
U
the work done by the Brazil-Argentina Permanent Com- monizing it with the registers and reports s
mittee on Nuclear Policy to further the cooperation between both countries to the Agency in accordance w
countries in the areas of research, exchange of information, ments in force;
industrial integration, exchange of nuclear materials, develop- 3. to undertake negotiations with the Inter
ment of joint projects and policy coordination; Energy Agency for the celebration of a Join
the Presidential and technical visits to nuclear facilities of ment based on the Common Accounting and
both countries, especially to the uranium enrichment plants of 4. to take, pending the conclusion of the S
Pilcaniyeu and Ipero, and to the laboratories radiochemical ment with the International Atomic Energy Ag
processes of Ezeiza, which constitute clear evidence of the level conducive to the full entry into force of the
of mutual confidence reached between Brazil and Argentina; and scription of Nuclear Weapons in Latin Am
Taking into account: Tlatelolco), with regard to both countries, including action relat
that the Permanent Committee developed control mecha- ing to the updating and improvement of its text.
Arms
Control
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1994
11
The Antecedents credited by the lack of any credible case for non-nuclear-weapon countries had some
such use. The military leaders and govern- basis in fact. The Great Powers interested in
The decisions by Argentina and Brazil ment then began to argue that the intrusive- avoiding the proliferation of nuclear weap
to forgo the production of nuclear weapons ness of IAEA inspections would interfere ons established restrictions on exports of
is closely linked to the return of democratic with the need to protect industrial secrets. sensitive materials and technology to Ar
rule in both countries after decades of mili- Based partly on this argument, the militar- gentina and Brazil as they did to several
tary governments. ies of Argentina and Brazil imposed secrecy other nuclear “threshold” countries (India,
Both countries refused to sign the NPT on many of their nuclear activities, which Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and
when it opened for signature in July 1968, increased Great Power suspicions. South Africa). This made it possible for
principally on the grounds that the NPT many in the threshold countries to argue
was discriminatory, “freezing” the world that the non-proliferation policies of the
into two categories: nuclear-weapon and Military Attitudes in Latin America industrialized countr
non-nuclear-weapon states. They saw this commercial interests and for neocolonialis
discrimination as objectionable per se, im- Military groupsauthorized or not by tic schemes, and that t
pinging on a state’s sovereignty; they also the top leaders of the governments of Ar- was to slow technological d
argued that the treaty would severely con- gentina and Brazilthrived on the secrecy countries that could
strain the technological development of surrounding nuclear activities and used in- Great Powers in supply
non-nuclear states. formation on alleged activities in the other als and services, depriving them of impor
The Brazilian military regime, which country as an excuse to obtain more re- tant technological “spin-off” applications
took over in 1964, was particularly strong sources from their own governments. This in the areas of materials and electronics,
in raising a series of objections to the NPT. was candidly admitted recently by retired
First, the government objected that the Brigadier General Hugo de Olizeira Piva of
treaty would erode Brazil’s technological the Brazilian air force who directed nuclear Lessons for Industrialized Countries
independence. Such concerns, which are efforts for many years at an experimental
deeply rooted in the militaries in Latin laser uranium enrichment facility at the Air Because of such arguments, it is vital
America in general, reflected the Brazilian Force Technological Center in Sao Jose dos that, with the success of denuclearization in
military’s determination to pursue an au- Campos.5 It now appears this group actu- Latin America, the industrialized countries
tarkic style of development that would not ally began secretly to prepare deep wells for do not maintain strong discriminatory ex
tie Brazil to the international economy. testing nuclear explosives in the distant port policies. President Clinton’s new non
Second, the military government ar- state of Para in northern Brazil. proliferation policy, for example, says the
gued that adherence to the NPT would pre- The fear among the military that the United States “will not oppose” programs
vent development of nuclear explosives for emerging non-proliferation regime could in Japan and Western Europe that continue
peaceful purposes, an argument soon dis- constrain technological development in the to produce plutonium (a weapons-usable
material) for civilian use, but will seek to
discourage such activity in “regions of in
stability and high prospective risk.”
If Latin America is considered such a
region, this discriminatory policy under
mines the efforts of those in the region who
have been arguing against the develop
ment of a nuclear weapon option in their
home countries. Although restrictive ex
port policies did not prevent India from
detonating a nuclear device in 1974, or pre
vent Iraq (and possibly other countries)
from going a long way toward obtaining
nuclear weapons, it is reasonable for ex
porting countries not to abet plutonium
separation and use. But a more acceptable
policy for the United States and other in
dustrialized countries to pursue would be
one that discouraged the reprocessing of
spent fuel to produce plutonium every
where, not just in “regions of instability.”6
c
?|
sa
£
3 The Role of Democracy
Brazilian
Brazilian
President Fernando Collor de Mello (center) and President
Argentine President Carlos Saul Menem Two general characteristics
Fernando
of nuclear
Collor
de
Mel
(right)
(right)
shake hands with International Atomicshake
Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General
hands
Hans Blix programs in Brazil during
with
the period of
International
Ato
on December
on
13,1991, December
after signing ceremonies for the Quadripartite Agreement
13,1991,
in Vienna, which authoritarian government (1964-1985)
after
signing
ceremon
joinsjoins
their countries with the IAEAtheir
and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency
for Accounting and Control opened the way for a definite
change of
countries
with
thelAEAand
the
B
ofof
Nuclear
Nuclear
Materials in a comprehensive
Materials
safeguards agreement.
in
a
mood
comprehensive
in the public and in Congress on
12
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1994
saf
nuclear matters. First, the civilian nuclear In 1980, a meeting at the presidential activity in the national territory will only be
program for the production of electricity palace between the president and the presi- admitted for peaceful purposes, and ap
was very seriously mismanaged and ran dent of the Brazilian Association for the proval in the Congress.”7 This language,
into heavy opposition from many sectors of Progress of Science signalled the govern- which is rather strong, was preferred over
society. Second, the military nuclear pro- ment’s willingness to begin a constructive an even stronger proposal which stated that
gram, or “parallel program,” which was dialogue on nuclear policy with the “dissi- “Brazilian participation is forbidden in pro
conducted under stringent secrecy, gave dent” scientists. jects leading to the development of nuclear
rise to strong suspicions inside and out of Other factors further discredited the weapons.” Nevertheless, the fact that an
the country that it was designed to produce idea of nuclear reactors as a solution to article was inserted in the Brazilian consti
nuclear weapons. Brazil’s electricity production problems. tution forbidding non-peaceful nuclear ac
The commercial civilian nuclear pro- For one, the Westinghouse reactor, which tivities is quite extraordinary,
gram in Brazil was started in 1968 with the started operating around 1980, proved to be The conditions were therefore set for
construction of a 624-megawatt (electric) an unreliable source of electricity, because the president of Brazil and some of the
light water reactor (purchased from West- it had frequent breakdowns and long peri- ministers of the civilian government
inghouse) on the ocean shore midway be
tween Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The
reactor soon became a cause for concern
due to problems with the foundations of the “Bilateral OV regional Systems of accounting (Mil
control such as the one established by Argentina and
in the case of an accident. Despite these Brazil might not be considered entirely trustworthy
problems, in 1975 the military government . .i r * n?…
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