UCLA Normality of Crime Formal & Substantive Rationalization Law Discussions You will have to read the 3 following articles and write a 1.5 page double spa

UCLA Normality of Crime Formal & Substantive Rationalization Law Discussions You will have to read the 3 following articles and write a 1.5 page double spaced summary on the article. Please make sure that you use 3 separate word documents. I have attached the documents. If you have any questions, please let me know. You do not have to read all the pages of the articles, as long as you can write a summary on it, I am fine with whatever you want to read. THEORIES
OF
SOCIETY
Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory
VOLUME II
The Free Press of Glencoe
COPYRIGHT© 1961 BY THE FREE PRESS OF GLENCOE, INC.
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
All rights in this book are reserved. No part of the book
may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever
without written permission except in the case of brief
quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.
For information, address:
THE FREE PRESS OF GLENCOE
A DIVISION OF THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
THE CROWELL-COLLIER PUBLISHING COMPANY
60 Fifth Avenue, New York 11
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 61-9171
DESIGNED BY STONEY SOLOMON
First Printing June 1961
Second Printing March 1962
872
Part Three, Sec. D-Social Structure, Motivation of Deviant, Conforming Behavior
I- THE ELEMENTS OF DEVIANCE AND
SOCIAL CONTROL
1. On the Normality of Crime
BY
EMILE DURKHEIM
IF THERE is any fact whose pathological
character appears incontestable, that fact is crime.
All criminologists are agreed on this point. AI·
though they explain this pathology differently, they
are unanimous in recognizing it. But Jet us see if
this problem does not demand a more extended
consideration.
We shall apply the foregoing rules. Crime is
present not only in the majority of societies of one
particular species but in all societies of all types.
There is no society that is not confronted with the
problem of criminality. Its fonn changes ; the acts
thus characterized are not the same everywhere;
but, everywhere and always, there have been men
who have behaved in such a way as to draw upon
themselves penal repression. If, in proportion as
societies pass from the lower to the higher types,
the rate of criminality, i.e., the relation between
the yearly number of crimes and the population,
tended to decline, it might be believed that crime,
while still normal, is tending to lose this character
of normality. But we have no reason to believe
that such a regression is substantiated. Many facts
would seem rather to indicate a movement in the
opposite direction. From the beginning of the [nineteenth] century, statistics enable us to follow the
course of criminality. It has everywhere increased.
~n France the increase is nearly 300 per cent. There
1s, then, no phenomenon that presents more indisputably all the symptoms of normality, since it
appears closely connected with the conditions of
all collective life. To make of crime a form of social
morbidity would be to admit that morbidity is not
something accidental, but, on the contrary, that in
certain cases it grows out of the fundamental constitution of the living organism; it would result in
wiping out all distinction between the physiological
and the pathological. No doubt it is possible that
Reprinted from Emile Durkheim, Tile Rules of Sociological M ethod, trans. Sarah Solovay and John Mueller, ed.
George E. G. Catlin (G lencoe, Ill. : The Free Press 1950)
pp. 65- 75, with the permission of The Free Press.
‘
‘
crime itself will have abnormal forms as, for elt·
ample, when its rate is unusually high. This excess
is, indeed, undoubtedly morbid in nature. What is
normal, simply, is the existence of criminality,
provided that it attains and does not exceed, for
each social type, a certain level, which it is per·
haps not impossible to fix: in conformity with the
preceding rules. 1
Here we are, then, in the presence of a conclu·
sion in appearance quite paradoxical. Let us make
no mistake. To classify crime among the phenomena
of normal sociology is not to say merely that it is
an inevitable, although regrettable phenomenon,
due to the incorrigible wickedness of men; it is
to affirm that it is a factor in public health, an
integral part of all healthy societies. This result is,
at first glance, surprising enough to have puzzled
even ourselves for a long time. Once this first surprise bas been overcome, however, it is not difficult
to find reasons explaining this normality and at
the same time confirming it.
In the first place crime is normal because a
society exempt from it is utterly impossible. Crime,
we have shown elsewhere, consists of an act that
offends certain very strong collective sentiments.
In a society in which criminal acts are no longer
committed, the sentiments they offend would have
to be found without exception in all individual consciousnesses, and they must be found to exist with
the same degree as sentiments contrary to them.
Assuming that this condition could actually be
realized, crime would not thereby disappear; it
would only change its form, for the very cause
which would thus dry up the sources of criminality
would immediately open up new ones.
1. From the fact that crime is a phenomenon of normal
sociology, it does not follow that the criminal is an individual normally constituted from the biological and psychological points of view. The two questions are independent
of each other. This independence will be better understood
when we have shown, later on, the difference between psychological and sociological facts.
.
Emile Durkheim: On the Normality of Crime
Indeed, for the collective sentiments which are
protected by the penal law of a people at a specified moment of its history to take possession of the
public conscience or for them to acquire a stronger
hold where they have an insufficient grip, they
must acquire an intensity greater than that which’
they had hitherto had. The community as a whole
must experience them more vividly, for it can acquire from no other source the greater force necessary to control these individuals who formerly
were the most refractory. For murderers to disappear, the horror of bloodshed must become
greater in those social strata from which murderers
are recruited;· but, firsLjt. must become greater
throughout the entire society. Moreover, the very
absence of crime would directly contribute to
produce this horror; because any sentiment seems
much more respectable when i~ is always and
uniformly respected.
One easily overlooks the consideration that these
strong states of the common consciousnesS carrnot
be thus reinforced without reinforcing at the same
time the more feeble states, whose violation previously gave birth to mere infraction of convention
-since the weaker ones are only the prolongation,
the attenuated form of the stronger. Thus robbery
and simple bad taste injure the same single altruistic sentiment, the respect for that which is
another’s. However, this same sentiment is less
grievously offended by bad taste than by robbery;
and since, in addition, the average consciousness
has not sufficient intensity to ‘react keenly to the
bad taste, it is. treated with greater tolerance. That
is why the person guilty of bad taste is’ merely
blamed, whereas the t~ief is punished. But, if this
sentiment grows stronger, to the point of silencing
in all consciousnesses the inclination which disposes man to steal, he will become more sensitive
to the offenses which, until then, touched him but
lightly. He will react against them, then, with more
energy; they will be the object of greater opprobrium, which will transform certain of them from
the simple moral faults that they were and give them
the quality of crimes. For example, improper con·
tracts, or contracts improperly executed, which
only incur public blame or civil damages, will become offenses in law,
Imagine a society of saints, a perfect cloister of
exemplary individuals. Crimes, properly so called,
will there be unknown; but faults which appear
venial to the layman will create ·there the same
scandal that the ordinary offense does in ordinary
consciousnesses. If, then, this society has the power
to judge and punish, it will define these acts as
criminal and will treat them as such. For the same
reason, the perfect and upright man judges his
873
smallest failings with a severity that the majority
reserve for acts more truly in the nature of an
offense. Formerly, acts of violence against persons
were more frequent than they are today, because respect for individual dignity was less strong. As this
has increased, these crimes have become more rare;
and also, many acts violating this sentiment have
been introduced into the penal law which were
not inciuded there in primitive times.•
In order to exhaust all the hypotheses logically
possible, it will perhaps be asked why this unanimity does not extend to all collective sentiments
without exception. Why should not even the most
feeble sentiment gather enough energy to prevent
all dissent? The moral consciousness of the society
would be present in its entirety in all the individuals,
with a vitality sufficient to prevent all acts offending it-the purely conventional faults as well as
the crimes. But a uniformity so universal and absolute is utterly impossible; for the immediate physical milieu in which each one of us is placed, the
hereditary antecedents, and the social influences
vary from one individual to the next, and consequently diversify consciousnesses. It is impossible
for all to be alike, if only because each one has his
own organism and that these organisms occupy
different areas in space. This is why, even among
the lower peoples, where individual originality is
very little developed, it nevertheless does exist.
Thus, since thee~ cannot be a society in which the
individuals do not differ more or less from the col·
lective type, it is also inevitable that, among these
divergences, there are some with a criminal character. What confers this character upon ·them is not
the intrinsic quality of a given act but that definition
which the collective conscience lends them. If the
collective conscience is stronger, if it has enough
authority practically to suppress these divergences,
it will also be more sensitive, more exacting; and,
reacting against th.e slightest deviations with the
energy it otherwise displays only against more considerable infractions, it will attribute to them the
same gravity as formerly to crimes. In other words,
it will designate them as criminal.
Crime is, then, ne.”~sary; it is bound up with the
fundamental conditions of all social life and by
that very fact it is useful, because these conditions
of which it is a part are themselves indispensable to
the normal evolution of morality and law.
Indeed, it is no longer possible today to dispute
the fact that law and morality vary from one social
type to the next, nor that they change within the
same type if the conditions of life are modified.
But, in order that these transformations may be
possible, the collective sentiments at the basis of
2. Calumny, insults, slander, fraud, etc.
874
Part Three, Sec. D–Social Structure, Motivation of Deviant, Conforming Behavior
morality must not be hostile to change, and consequently must have but moderate energy. If they
were too strong, they would no longer be plastic.
Every pattern is an obstacle to new patterns, to the
extent that the first pattern is inflexible. The better a structure is articulated, the more it offers a
healthy resistance to all modification; and this is
equally true of functional, as of anatomical, organization. If there were no crimes this condition could
not have been fulfilled ; for such a hypothesis presupposes that collective sentiments have ‘arrived at
~ de~ree of int~nsity ~nexampled in history. Nothmg IS good mdefimtely and to an unlimited
extent. The authority which the moral conscience
enjoys must not be excessive; otherwise no one
would dare criticize it, and it would too easily con~e~ !nto an .i~m~table form. To make progress,
mdtv1dual ongmallty must be able to express itself.
In order thaUhe originality of the idealist whose·
dreams transcend his century may find expression,
it is necessary that the originality of the criminal,
who is below the l~vel of his time, shall also be
possible. One does not occur without the other.
. Nor is this all. Aside from this indirect utility,
1t happens that crime itself plays a useful role in this
evolu.tion. Crime implies not only that the way
rematns open to necessary changes but that in certain cases it directly prepares these changes. Where
cri-“;le exists, collective sentiments are sufficiently
fiex1ble to take on a new form, and crime sometimes helps to determine the form they will take.
How many times, indeed, it is only an anticipation
of future morality-a step toward what will be!
According to Athenian law, Socrates was a criminal,
and his condemnation was no more than just.
However, h~s crime, namely the independence of
his thought, rendered a service not only to humanity but to his country. It served to prepare a new
morality and faith which the Athenians needed
since the traditions by which they had lived untii
then were no longer in harmony with the current
~onditions of life. Nor is the case of Socrates unique;
1t is reproduced periodically in history. It would
never have been possible to establish the freedom
?f t~ought we now enjoy if the regulations prohibitmg 1t had not been violated before being solemnly
abrogated. At that time, however, the violation was
a crime, since it was an offense against sentiments
sti.ll v~ry keen in the average conscience. And yet
th1s cnme was useful as a prelude to reforms which
daily became more necessary. Liberal philosophy
had as its precursors the heretics of all kinds who
were justly punished by secular authorities during
the entire course of the Middle Ages and until the
eve of modern times.
From this point of view the fundamental facts of
criminality present themselves to us in an entirely
new light. Contrary to current ideas, the criminal
no Jonge_r . seems a totally unsociable being, a sort
of paras1t1c element, a strange and unassimilable
body, introduced into the midst of society.• On
the contrary, he plays a definite role in social life.
Crime, for its part, must no longer be conceived as
an evil that cannot be too much suppressed. There
is no occasion for self-congratulation when the
crime rate drops noticeably below the average
level, for we may be certain that this apparent progress is associated with some social disorder. Thus,
the number of assault cases never falls so low as
in times of want.’ With the drop in the crime rate,
and as a reaction to it, comes a revision, or the need
of a revision in the theory of punishment. If, indeed, crime is a disease, its punishment is its remedy
and cannot be otherwise conceived; thus, all the
discussions it arouses bear on the point of determining what the punishment must be in order to
fulfil this cole of remedy. If crime is not pathological at aU, the object of punishment cannot be to cure
it, and its true function must be sought elsewhere.
It is far from the truth, then, that the rules
previously stated have no other justification than
to satisfy an urge for logical formalism of little
practical value, since, on the contrary, according
as they are or are not applied, the most essential
social facts are entirely changed in character. It
the foregoing example is particularly convincingand this was our hope in dwelling upon it-there
are likewise many others which might have been
cited with equal profit. There is no society where
the rule does not exist that the punishment must
be proportional to the offense; yet, for the Italian
school, this principle is but an invention of jurists,
without adequate basis.
For these criminologists the entire penal system,
as it has functioned until the present day among all
known peoples, is a phenomenon contrary to nature. We have already seen that, for M. Garofalo,
the criminality peculiar to lower societies is not at
3. We have ourselves committed the error of speaking
thus of the criminal, because of a failure to apply our
rule (Division du travail social, pp. 395-96).
4. Although crime is a fact cf normal sociology, it does
not follow th at we must not abhor it. Pain itself has nothing
desirable about it; the individual dislikes it as society does
crime, and yet it is a function of normal physiology. Not
only is it necessarily derived from the very constitution
of every living organism, but it plays a useful role in life
for which reason it cannot be replaced. It would, then, ~
a singular distort ion of our thought to present it as an
apology for crime. We would not even think of protesting
against such an interpretation, did we not know to what
accusations and misunderstandings one exposes oneself
when one undertakes to study moral facts objectively and
to speak of them in a different language from that of the
layman.
Emile Durkheim: On the Normality of Crime
all natural. For socialists it is the capitafist system,
in spite of its wide diffusion, which constitutes a
deviation from the normal state, produced, as it
was, by violence and fraud. Spencer, on the contrary, maintains that our administrative centrali·
7.ation and the extension of governmental powers
are the radical vices of our societies, although both
proceed most regularly and generally as we advance
in history. We do not believe that scholars have
ever systematically endeavored to distinguish the
normal or abnormal character of social phenomena
from their degree of generality. It is always with a
great array of dialectics that these questions are
partly resolved.
Once we have eliminated this criterion, however,
we are not only exposed to confusions and partial
errors, such as those just pointed out, but science
is rendered all but impossible. Its immediate object
is the study of the normal type. If, however, the
most widely diffused facts can be pathological, it
is possible that the normal types never existed in
actuality; and if that is the case, why study the
facts? Such study can only confirm our prejudices
and fix us in our errors. If punishment and the responsibility for crime are only the products of
ignorance and barbarism why strive to know them
in order to derive the normal forms from them?
By such arguments the mind is diverted from a ·
reality in which we have lost interest, and falls
back on itself in order to seek within itself the
materials necessary to reconstruct its wo.rld. In
order that sociology may treat facts as things, the
sociologist must feel the necessity of studying them
exclusively.
The principle object of all sciences of life, whether individual or social, is to define and explain the
normal state and to distinguish it from its opposite.
If, however, normality is not given in the things
themselves-if it is, on the contrary, a character
we may or may not impute to them-this solid
footing is lost. The mind is then complacent in the
face of a reality which has little to teach it; it is no
longer restrained by the matter which it is analyz-
875
ing, since it is the mind, in some manner or other,
that determines the matter.
The various principles we have established up to
the present are, then, closely interconnected. In
order that sociology may be a true science of
things, the generality of phenomena must be taken
as the criterion of their normality.
Our method has, moreover, the advantage of
regulating action at the same time as thought. If
the social values are not subjects of observation
but can and must be determined by a sort of
mental calculus, no limit, so to speak, clm be set
for the free inventions of the imagination in search
of the best. For how may -we assign to perfection
a limit? It escapes all limitation, by definition. The
goal of humanity recedes into infinity, discouraging
some by its very remoteness and arousing others
who, in order to draw a little nearer to it, quicken
the pace and plunge into revolutions. This practical
dilemma may be escaped if the desirable is defined
in the same way as in health and normality and if
health is something that is defined as inherent in
things. For then the object of our efforts is both
given and defined at the same time. It is no longer a
matter of pursuing desperately an objective that
retreats as one advances, but of wo…
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