FIN2050 CalStateLa Business Law Legal & Regulatory Environment Cases Discussions 6 Short Cases Report about Finance Class which is Business Law, Legal and

FIN2050 CalStateLa Business Law Legal & Regulatory Environment Cases Discussions 6 Short Cases Report about Finance Class which is Business Law, Legal and Regulatory Envirnment.I will post the cases to Study Pool. and Also there is an example who to brife a case report.Because I cant upload more than 6 files, I can send to you the rest case information by email or google docu. HOW TO BRIEF A CASE
CASE BRIEF FORMAT – IRAC METHOD
Use the following format for briefing of the cases:
1. Name of the case
2. Statement of Facts
3. Issue (Question)
4. Rule (Statement of the Law)
5. Application
6. Conclusion
NOTES
1. The statement of facts should be a short summary including only the essential facts. In
most cases you read, the decision is based on a few determining facts. DO NOT
COPY THE ENTIRE FACTUAL STATEMENT FROM THE TEXT. State the
procedural facts (who is suing whom, the cause of action, the remedy sought, the result
in the lower court or courts) – what we call the “posture of the case.”
2. The ISSUE or question of law is the central or focal legal question in the case. The
student will have to determine the question of law by a careful reading of the case.
NOTE: There may be more than one issue.
3. The RULE of law will generally be obvious. However, the judge does not always state
the rule of law clearly. In some cases, it must be abstracted by a careful reading of the
text. The question to ask is, “What legal principle does this case stand for?” If there is
more than one issue, there should be a rule for each issue.
4. APPLYING the rule or rules of law to the facts of the case is an important part of
briefing. Look for specific facts in the case to justify the conclusion of the court. This
is the analytical aspect.
5. CONCLUSION – how the Court answers the problem.
6. All case briefs must be in writing and must contain ALL six parts of the case brief
format.
ENGLAND v. S & M FOODS, INC.
511 So. 2d 1313 (La.Ct.App. 1987)
OPINION
[*1314] The plaintiff, Betty England, instituted this action against defendants, S & M Foods,
Inc. and Larry Garley, to recover damages for a battery which allegedly occurred in a work
related argument. Defendants appeal the trial court judgment which awarded plaintiff $ 1,000.00
for humiliation and embarrassment as a result of the battery. We affirm.
Plaintiff was employed by S & M Foods, Inc. at its Dairy Queen restaurant in Tallulah, Louisiana
when the incident occurred. Larry Garley was the manager of this restaurant. Garley became
upset when several hamburgers were incorrectly prepared resulting in them being returned by the
customer who had ordered them. Garley allegedly expressed his dissatisfaction by using profane
language and throwing a hamburger which hit plaintiff on the leg.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in concluding [**2] a battery was
committed.
Defendants contend no battery was committed because Garley did not intend to inflict bodily
harm upon plaintiff. They argue Garley was disgusted about the returned hamburgers and he
threw one hamburger toward a trash can and it inadvertently splattered on plaintiff. Defendants
contend Garley did not intend to physically touch or injure plaintiff and her embarrassment was
caused as much by her overreaction to the situation as by Garley’s conduct.
Plaintiff contends a battery may consist of forcible touching in an angry, revengeful, rude or
insolent manner and damages are recoverable for humiliation and mental distress. She asserts
Garley admitted he may have struck her with the hamburger, he did not deny using profanity, he
was looking at her when he threw the hamburger and several customers observed the incident.
Plaintiff contends the incident caused her to cry and become emotionally upset. For these reasons,
plaintiff contends the judgment should be affirmed.
A battery is any intentional and unpermitted contact with the plaintiff’s person or anything
attached to it or practically identified with it. Vascocu v. Singletary, 404 So.2d 301 (La. App.
[**3] 3d Cir. 1981), writ den., 409 So.2d 676 (La. 1981); Prosser: Law of Torts, (4th Ed.), p. 34.
In the area of intentional torts, intent means the defendant either desired to bring about the
physical results of his act or believed they were substantially certain to follow from what he did.
Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475 (La. 1981); Monk v. Veillon, 312 So.2d 377 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1975). In order to recover for a battery, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that his damages resulted from an unprovoked attack by the defendant. Gilliam v.
Williams, 451 So.2d 681 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984); Hemsley v. Sims, 325 So.2d 877 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1976), writ den., 328 So.2d 374 (La. 1976).
Mental distress and humiliation in connection with a battery are compensable items of damage.
Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La. 1979); Squyres v. Phillips, 285 So.2d 337 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1973); Earle v. Wilhite, 299 So.2d 393 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
The trial judge is in a better position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and the weight of
evidence than an appellate [*1315] court which does not see or hear the witnesses. For this
reason, [**4] a reviewing court should adopt the trial court’s finding as its own in the absence of
clear error, even if other conclusions from the same evidence are equally reasonable. Arceneaux
v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La. 1978); Harris v. Pineset, 499 So.2d 499 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1986).
The trial judge found that Garley committed a battery by throwing a hamburger which hit
plaintiff on the leg. The trial judge further found the incident occurred in front of patrons and
other employees of Dairy Queen and caused plaintiff humiliation and embarrassment. For the
reasons which follow, we find no clear error in these findings of the trial judge.
Plaintiff testified Garley used profane language when he told her to prepare the hamburgers
correctly. She stated Garley, while looking straight at her, then threw the hamburger which hit her
on the leg. Plaintiff testified she argued with Garley about the matter and several patrons
observed the incident which caused her to cry and become emotionally upset.
Garley testified he threw the hamburger toward a trash can because he was disgusted with the
way the hamburgers were being prepared. He stated he did not see where the hamburger hit,
but [**5] noticed some of it splattered on plaintiff and Alice Rash, another employee. Garley
testified he did not intend to hit anyone with the hamburger. He stated he and plaintiff argued
about the matter and he told the plaintiff to go home.
Ms. Rash testified she did not see Garley throw the hamburger, but observed a hamburger hit the
floor and it splattered mayonnaise and mustard on her and plaintiff.
Two other employees who were working on the day of the incident heard Garley’s complaints
about the hamburgers going out wrong and saw a hamburger hit the floor, but did not see Garley
throw it.
The totality of the evidence provided a substantial basis for the trial judge to conclude Garley
must have been substantially certain the hamburger would hit plaintiff or splatter on plaintiff
when he threw it toward her after becoming disgusted over the manner in which the hamburgers
were being prepared. His contact with plaintiff was, therefore, intentional and unpermitted and
constituted a battery. The incident occurred in front of several patrons and other employees of
Dairy Queen and caused plaintiff embarrassment and humiliation, although she suffered no
physical injuries.
The trial judge [**6] had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses as they testified. The
record shows no clear error in the trial judge’s finding that a battery was committed.
The judgment appealed is affirmed at defendants’ costs.
AFFIRMED.
EXAMPLE CASE BRIEF
(1) Title: England v. S&M Foods, Inc., (La.Ct.App. 1987).
Judgment at trial for England; Defendants appeal.
(2) Facts: England was employed at a Dairy Queen Restaurant owned by S&M Foods,
Inc. The restaurant manager, Garley, used profane language, looked straight at
England and threw a hamburger which hit her on the leg. Another employee,
Rash, testified that she did not see Garley throw the hamburger but that it did hit
the floor and splatter mayonnaise and mustard on her and England.
(3) Issue: Did Garley have the requisite intent for battery?
(4) Rule: A defendant has acted with intent if he or she either desired to bring about the
physical results of his or her act or believed they were substantially certain to
result from his or her actions.
(5) Analysis: Garley threw a hamburger in England’s direction either hitting her directly on
the leg (her testimony) or indirectly (splattering her with mayonnaise and
mustard). He therefore acted with substantial certainty that offensive touching of
plaintiff would occur.
6. Conclusion: Judgment affirmed; the contact was a battery due to sufficient intent.
TARASOFF V. REGENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
17 Cal. 3d 425
Supreme Court of California, 1976
Facts: On October 27, 1969, Prosenjit Poddar killed
Tatiana Tarasoff. Tatiana’s parents claimed that two
months earlier, Poddar had confided his intention to kill
Tatiana to Dr. Lawrence Moore, a psychologist employed
by the University of California at Berkeley. They sued
the university, claiming that Dr. Moore should have
warned Tatiana and/or should have arranged for Poddar’s
confinement
Issue: Did Dr. Moore have a duty to Tatiana Tarasoff, and
did be breach that duty?
Excerpts from Justice Tobriner’s Decision: Although
under the common law, as a general rule, one person
owed no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to
warn those endangered by such conduct, the courts
have carved out an exception to this rule in cases
Case 1
Carey v. Davis, 190 lowa 720 (1921).
263 Mass. 73 (1928).
*Pridgen v. Boston Housing Authority, 364 Mass. 696 (1974).
86
UNIT 1 The Legal Environment
Case 1
in which the defendant stands in some special
relationship to either the person whose conduct needs
to be controlled or in a relationship to the foreseeable
victim of that conduct. Applying this exception to the
present case, we note that a relationship of defendant
therapists to either Tatiana or Poddar will suffice to
establish a duty of care.
We recognize the difficulty that a therapist encoun-
ters in attempting to forecast whether a patient presents a
serious danger of violence. Obviously we do not require
that the therapist, in making that determination, render a
perfect performance; the therapist need only exercise that
reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily
possessed and exercised by members of the field) under
similar circumstances.
In the instant case, however, the pleadings do
not raise any question as to failure of defendant
therapists to predict that Poddar presented a serious
danger of violence. On the contrary, the present com-
plaints allege that defendant therapists did in fact pre-
dict that Poddar would kill, but were negligent in fail.
ing to warn.
In our view, once a therapist does in fact determine,
or under applicable professional standards reasonably
should have determined, that a patient poses a serious
danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that
danger.
[The Tarasoffs have stated a legitimate claim against
Dr. Moore.]
Landmark Case
Case 2
us,
Facts: See the discussion
of the Duke Power Co.’s
Griggs v. DUKE Power Co.
Negroes cannot be shown
to be related to job per-
job requirements in the
401 U.S. 424
carlier “Statutory Inter-
United States Supreme Court, 1971
formance, the practice is
prohibited.
pretation” section
On the record before
Issue: Did Title VII of
neither the high
the 1964 Civil Rights Act
school completion requi-
require that employment
rement nor the general
tests be job-related?
intelligence test is shown to bear a demonstrable rela-
Excerpts from Chief Justice Burger’s Decision: The tionship to successful performance of the jobs for which
objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain it was used.
from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality Senator Tower offered an amendment which was
of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have adopted verbatim and is now the testing provision of
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of section 703(h). Speaking for the supporters of Title VII,
white employees over other employees. Under the Act, Senator Humphrey endorsed the amendment, stating
practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and “Senators on both sides of the aisle who were deeply
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained interested in Title VII have examined the text of this
if they operate to “freeze” the status quo of prior amendment and have found it to be in accord with the
discriminatory employment practices.
intent and purpose of that title.” The amendment was
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but then adopted. From the sum of the legislative history
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory relevant in this case, the conclusion is inescapable that
in operation. The touchstone is business necessity, the
requirement that employment tests be job related
If an employment practice which operates to exclude comports with congressional intent.
CHAPTER 4
Como La Statutory Land Administrative
101
Landmark Case
Case 3
Facts: Biswell operated a
pawnshop and had
UNITED STATES V. BISWELL
In the context of a reg.
a
license to sell “Sporting
ulatory inspection system
406 U.S. 311
weapons.” Treasury agents
United States Supreme Court, 1972
of business premises that
demanded to inspect Bis-
is carefully limited in time,
well’s locked storeroom.
place, and scope, the legal-
The officials claimed the
ity of the search depends
not on consent but on the
Gun Control Act of 1968
authority of a valid statute.
give them the right to search without a warrant.
Federal regulation of the interstate traffic in fire-
That law says, in part, “the Secretary of the Treas- arms is undeniably of central importance to federal
ury] may enter during business hours the premises of any
firearms dealer for the purpose of inspecting or examining
efforts to prevent violent crime. Large interests are at
stake, and inspection is a crucial part of the regulatory
(1) any records or documents required to be kept by such scheme.
dealer, and (2) any firearms or ammunition kept or stored Here, if inspection is to be effective and serve as a
by such dealer.”
credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspec-
Biswell voluntarily opened the storeroom, and the tions are essential. In this context, the prerequisite of a
agent found two sawed-off rifles inside. The guns did warrant could easily frustrate inspection; and if the neces-
not remotely meet the definition of “sporting weapons,” sary flexibility as to time, scope, and frequency is to be
and Biswell was convicted on firearms charges.
preserved, the protections afforded by a warrant would be
The appellate court found that because the search negligible.
violated the Fourth Amendment, the rifles could not be It is also plain that inspections for compliance with
admitted as evidence. It reversed the conviction, and the the Gun Control Act pose only limited threats to the
government appealed to the Supreme Court
dealer’s justifiable expectations of privacy. When a dealer
chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business
Issue: Did the agent’s warrantless search violate the
and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowl-
Constitution?
edge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition
Excerpts from Justice White’s Decision: When the will be subject to effective inspection. Each licensee is
officers asked to inspect respondent’s locked storeroom, annually furnished with a revised compilation of ordi-
they were merely asserting their statutory right, and nances that describe his obligations. The dealer is not left
respondent was on notice as to their identity and the to wonder about the purposes of the inspector or the
legal basis for their action. Respondent’s submission to limits of his task.
lawful authority and his decision to step aside and permit We have little difficulty in concluding that where, as
the inspection rather than face a criminal prosecution is here, regulatory inspections further urgent federal inter-
analogous to a householder’s acquiescence in a search est, and the possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy
pursuant to a warrant when the alternative is a possible are not of impressive dimensions, the inspection may
criminal prosecution for refusing entry or a forcible entry, proceed without a warrant where specifically authorized
In neither case does the lawfulness of the search depend by statute. The seizure of respondent’s sawed-off rifles
on consent; in both, there is lawful authority independent was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the
of the will of the householder who might other things judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded to that court.
being equal, prefer no search at all.
You be the Judge Case 4
to
longer
obligated
Facts: Matthew Gabriel
GABRIEL V. ALBANY
refrain from plagiarizing,
was a student in Professor
COLLEGE OF PHARMACY
and so should not be
Pumo’s immunology class.
punished.
Professor Pumo’s syllabus
AND HEALTH SERVICES
outlined course require-
No. 2:12-cv 14
You Be the Judge: Was
ments and stated that
United States District Court for
the professor’s syllabus a
“plagiarism will not be tol-
the District of Vermont, 2013
offer whose acceptance formed
erated.” After grading the
an enforceable contract?
first assignment, Professor
Pumo realized that many papers had sentences copied from Argument for Gabriel: A syllabus is a contract. On the
other sources without citations. Instead of reporting every- first day of class, the professor presents the syllabus as an
one for plagiarism, Professor Pumo said she would give offer and students agree by staying in the course. Who has
students a “free pass” on one copied sentence. But Gabriel’s not chosen a class because of its particular workload or
paper contained many plagiarized sentences, so he assignments? The terms in the syllabus are promises upon
received a failing grade for the assignment.
which students rely. Professor Pumo unilaterally changed
Gabriel sued the professor for breach of contract. the written “rules of the game.” Once she broke her
He argued that the syllabus was a contract and that the promise, there was no longer a “deal.” Students should
“free pass” policy broke it-because that term was not not be held to her arbitrary rules.
part of their original agreement. According to Gabriel,
since the professor breached the contract, he was no
Argument for Professor: Professors do not intend to
make an offer when they hand out a syllabus-much less

Purchase answer to see full
attachment