Cal Poly Pomona Chapter 13 & 14 Social Contract Tradition Paper Please follow the requirements and read the book chapter 13, need 6 citation and each parag

Cal Poly Pomona Chapter 13 & 14 Social Contract Tradition Paper Please follow the requirements and read the book chapter 13, need 6 citation and each paragraph need 2 citation, one is from book，other one is from outside source. First picture please pick one or more book assignment idea. I have professor grade sheet, so please read it too. write 2 full pages, double space. Due US pacific time, 12/6 C H A P T E R 13
………………………………..
The Social Contract Tradition
The Theory and Its Attractions
The Lure of Proceduralism
One of the hardest and deepest problems for ethical inquiry is this: How
to begin?
Should we assume, from the outset, that any plausible ethical theory
will forbid rape and slavery and torture, and require compassion and kind­
ness? If so, then we can use these assumptions as a litmus test. Any theory
that contradicts these assumptions would be rejected. For instance, if killing
or torturing an innocent person were ever in your self- interest, then ethical
egoism would require you to perform such actions. It would therefore flunk
our test. That would be enough to show that ethical egoism is false.
A question naturally arises: Can we justify our basic assumptions
and defend the practice of rejecting any moral theory that doesn’t agree
with them? If a theory contradicts our basic assumptions about right and
wrong, why does that unde rmine the theory, rather than our assump­
tions? Aren’t we just begging the question against the ethical egoist, for
instance by assuming that self- interest could never justify torture or rape?
Defenders of this approach claim that there is no other alternative.
We have to start moral thinking from somewhere—why not with those
basic assumptions that almost everyone accepts, those that help support
most of our other ethical claims? We cant prove that these assumptions
are true. But that doesn’t make them illegitimate.
Why not? Because the fundame ntal starting points in every area
of thinking are beyond proof. It turns out, for instance, that the basic
194
C h a p t e r 13 The Social Cont ract Tradition: The Theory and Its Attractions
195
assumption be hind all scientific inquiry—that there is a physical world
outside o f our own m ind —cannot be proven. All the evidence we might
collect in order to prove it already assumes that such a world exists. Yet
that doesn’t render every scientific claim implausible or unjustified.
Many philosophers remain dissatisfied with this approach. They
believe that we can jus tify our basic moral views, rather than simply take
the m for granted. We can do that by coming up with a procedure that will
tell us the steps for dis tinguis hing right from wrong. The correct moral
views are those that emerge from the correct procedure. I call this sort of
approach proce duralis m.
Proceduralism tells us that we s hould not begin moral inquiry by
assuming, say, that slavery is wrong or that generosity is right. Make no
moral assumptions at this stage. Instead follow the correct procedure, and
the n see what the outcome is. Provided you’ve been careful, you’ll land on
the right answer to your moral question.
The golden rule is an instance of proceduralism. So is rule consequen­
tialism. So is Kants principle of universalizability. Each of these views tells
us to follow certain steps in order to discover what is right and wrong. One
of the main attractions of these views is that they do not take it for granted
that slavery, for instance, is immoral; rather, they promise to ex plain and
jus tify why slavery is immoral. They do this by showing respectively, that
(1) we wouldn’t like it if we were enslaved, (2) no optimific social rule
would pe rmit slavery, or (3) no universalizable maxim would allow slavery.
If you have been reading these chapters in order, you know that there
are significant problems with each of these proceduralist views. But that
doesn’t knock proceduralis m out of conte ntion, since there are many
other proceduralist theories. Perhaps the most important of these is the
s ocial contract the ory, nowadays known as contractarianis m—the view
that morality is based on a social contract.
The Background of the Social Contract Theory
Contractarianis m originate d as a political theory, and only later devel­
oped into a the ory o f morality. It tells us that laws are jus t if and only
if, they reflect the terms o f a social contract that free, equal, and rational
people would accept as the basis o f a cooperative life toge the r Its view
o f morality stems dire ctly from that political ideal: actions are m orally
right ju s t because they are pe rm itte d by rules that free, equal and rational
196
T h e F u n d a m e n t a l s o f E t h ic s
people w ould agree to live by, on the condition that others obey these rules
as well.
The theory’s political origins can be traced back to the ancient Greeks.
Early in the Republic, Plato’s brothers tell Socrates that they find the social
contract view both appealing and troubling. They challenge Socrates to
tell the m what is wrong with it. His answer takes up almost the whole of
the book, a testament to the power of contractarianism.
Here is the story that Socrates heard. We are all by nature largely, or
entirely, self- interested. What we want is power over others, physical secu­
rity, plenty of money, and sensual pleasure. Our deepest goal is to lord it
over everyone else. Who among us wouldn’t want the power of the presi­
dent or the wealth of Bill Gates—or, ideally both?
This points to an obvious problem. Everyone wants to be at the top
of the heap and only a few can make it there. Further no one wants to
be a patsy, the person who gets stepped on as others climb the ladder of
success. We each want to be Numbe r One. But we know that the chances
of making it are slim, and we want to avoid be ing trample d as others claw
the ir way to the top. So what do we do?
If we are rational, we will each agree to curb our self- interest and coop­
erate with one another. We ll do this conditionally —that is on the condition
that others do so as well. A complete free- for- all is going to make everyone
miserable. If we all stop trying to get the better of each other, and instead
agree to seek a little less for ourselves, the n we ll all be better off.
That is what reason and morality require of us, according to the social
contract theory. Starting with the assumptions that we each are largely moti­
vated by self- interest and that it is rational to be that way contractarianism
tells us that we each do best for ourselves by agreeing to limit the direct
pursuit of self- interest, and accept a bargain that gets us a pretty decent life.
That everyone gets such a life means that we give up the chance of an abso­
lutely fabulous life. But we also protect ourselves from a really terrible one,
life in which we are in the thick of a cutthroat competition, vulnerable to
the attacks of everyone around us. That is a deal worth making. Here’s why.
The Prisoners Dilemma
Consider life’s basic scenario: There is intense compe tition for scarce
resources. We each want as much of those resources as we can get. Being
rational we each try to get as much as we can, knowing that more for us
means less for someone else. Things are going to get very bad, very quickly.
Ch apt e r 13 The Social Cont ract Tradition: The Theory and Its Attractions
197
This is what happened to the thousands of fishermen who sought
ever- larger catches, resulting in the emptying of the Chesapeake Bay—for
centuries one of the worlds greatest fisheries. This is what happe ne d when
baseball players, Tour de France cyclists, and Olympic weight lifters began
to take increasingly dangerous anabolic steroids in a bid to gain a com­
petitive edge and lucrative championships. This is what happens when
a politician starts a smear campaign and his oppone nt feels the need to
ramp up the abuse in order to stand a fighting chance in the race. This is
what always happens in tur f battles over the spoils of an illegal drug trade.
These cases all share the same essential features. In each, there is
mounting compe tition over a scarce resource, and many are trying the ir
best to increase their share o f it. That seems to be rational, and yet, if every­
one stopped being so selfish each person would be better off. There would
still be fish in the Chesapeake, sustaining the communitie s s urrounding it.
Athletes would be safer, even if the world records in the ir fields were a bit
less spectacular.
These sorts of situations in which everyone would be better off by scal­
ing back their pursuit o f self- interest are known as pris one r’s dile mmas .
The name comes from a scenario introduced by economists, in which two
thieves (call the m A1 and Bob) are caught and sent to separate detention
cells. Being rational, A1 and Bob previously made a deal with each other:
if they get caught, they’ll each keep silent, to thwart the police and protect
themselves. Now that they have been captured, the police tell each one the
same thing: “If you keep your promise to your partner by keeping quiet,
and he rats you out then hes off the hook, and youre looking at a six- year
sentence. If you break your word and snitch on him while he remains silent,
youre home free, while he spends the next six years in jail. If you both keep
quiet you’ll each get two years. But if you both confess, you’ll each get fo ur 5
The following diagram will help you keep track o f the options. Each
numbe r represents years in jail. The first numbe r in each pair is Als prison
sentence; the second is Bobs
Bob
A1
Re mains Sile nt
(Coope ration)
Confesses
(Betrayal)
Re mains Sile nt
(Coope ration)
2 ,2
6 ,0
Confesses
(Betrayal)
0 ,6
4 ,4
198
T h e F u n d a m e n t a l s o f E t h ic s
Suppose that both criminals know about the various outcomes, and
that both have only one concern at this point: to minimize the ir jail time.
If they are both rational, what are they going to do?
You might think that its impossible to know the answer, since you
don’t know enough about A1 or Bob, their bond with each other, their
trustworthiness, and so on to make an informe d guess. But really, there is
no doubt that each is going to confess. They are going to break the ir prom­
ise to each other, landing themselves a four- year sentence apiece, Thats
a far cry from getting off scot- free, and double the two years they’d get if
they each kept quiet.
The important point is that re maining silent is the cooperative strat­
egy. Silence here means keeping ones word, honoring the terms o f the deal.
Confession is a betrayal, breaking ones promise, abandoning a partner.
Al and Bob are going to betray each other. Thats certain. They’ll do
this because they know the odds, because they are self- interested, and
because they are rational.
Why will they confess? Because no m atter w hat his accomplice does,
each crim inal w ill be better off by confessing.
Consider Als choices. Suppose that
Bob re mains s ile nt. Then if Al confesses, Al is home free. If Al keeps
his mouth shut, Al gets two years. So if Bob remains silent, Al should
confess. That will minimize his jail time. That is what he most wants.
So, if Al is rational he will confess.
Now suppose that
Bob confesses. Then if Al confesses Al gets four years in jail. Silence
gets him six. So if Bob confesses Al should confess, too.
Thus either way, Al does best for hims e lf by s pilling the beans and
breaking his promise to Bob. And of course Bob is reasoning in the same
way. So they are both going to confess and end up with four years in jail.
The prisoners dile mma isn’t jus t some interesting thought experi­
ment. Its real life. There are countless cases in which the rational purs uit
of self- interest will lead people to refuse to cooperate with one another,
even though this leaves everyone much worse off.
The Chesapeake fishermen were in a prisoners dile mma with one
another. So are world- class athletes, once they discover that some of their
competitors are taking performance- enhancing drugs. So are gang me m­
bers who are gunning for the ir compe tition. A cooperative strategy would
have saved the m the ir live lihoods or the ir lives.
Ch apt e r 13 The Social Cont ract Tradition: The Theory and Its Attractions
199
Cooperation and the State of Nature
So why don’t competitors cooperate? The answer is simple: because it is so
risky. The criminals in the prisoners dile mma could cooperate. But that
would mean taking a chance at a six- year sentence and betting everything
on your partne rs good faith. Unilaterally keeping silent, reducing your
catch, refusing the use o f steroids, forsaking violence—these are strategies
for suckers. Those who adopt the m may be virtuous, but they are the ones
who will be left be hind, rotting in jail, economically struggling, off the
Olympic podium or the victim o f an enemy’s gunshot. If enough people
are willing to do what it takes to ensure that they get ahead, the n youVe
either got to join in the compe tition or be the sacrificial lamb.
Englishman Thomas Hobbes (1588- 1679) the founde r o f mode rn
contractarianis m was especially concerned with one sort o f prisoners
dile mma. He invite d the readers of his magnum opus Leviathan, to imag­
ine a situation in which there was no government, no central authority, no
group with the exclusive power to enforce its will on others. He called this
situation the state o f nature . And he thought it was the worst place you
could ever be
In his words the state of nature is a “war o f all against all, in which
the life o f man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutis h and short.” People ruthlessly
compete with one another for whatever goods are available. Coope ration
is a sham, and trust is non- existent. Hobbes hims e lf lived through a state
of nature—the English Civil War—and thus had firs thand knowledge of
its miseries. If youVe ever read The Lord o f the Flies, you have an idea of
what Hobbes is talking about. As I write this, I can turn on my television
and see pictures of states of nature from around the world—in parts of
Syria, Iraq, and Nigeria. The scenes are terrible.
The Hobbesian state of nature is a prisoners dile mma. By seeking
to maximize self- interest, everyone is going to be worse off. In such dire
circumstances, everyone is compe ting to gain as much as he can, at the
expense of others. With so much at stake, an all- out compe tition is bound
to be very bad for almos t everyone. No one is so smart or strong or well
connected as to be free from danger.
There is an escape from the state o f nature, and the exit strategy is the
same for all prisoners dilemmas. We need two things: beneficial rules that
require cooperation and punis h betrayal, and an enforcer who ensures
that these rules are obeyed.
The rules are the terms o f the social contract. They require us to
give up the freedom to attack and to kill others, to cheat the m and lie to
200
T h e F u n d a m e n t a l s o f E t h ic s
the m, to beat and threaten the m and take from the m whatever we can.
In exchange for giving up these freedoms (and others), we gain the many
advantages of cooperation. It is rational to give up some of your freedom
provided that you stand a good chance o f getting something even better in
return. The peace and stability o f a well- ordered society is worth it. That is
the promise o f the social contract.
But you need more than good rules o f cooperation to escape from a
prisoners dile mma. You also need a way to make sure the rules are kept.
The state of nature comes to an end when people agree with one
another to give up the ir unlimite d freedoms and to cooperate on terms
that are beneficial to all. The proble m with agreements, though, is that
they can be broken. And without a strong incentive to keep the ir prom­
ises, people in prisoners dilemmas are going to break them. Just think of
Al and Bob in our original example,
Whats needed is a powerful person (or group) whose threats give
everyone excellent reason to keep the ir word. The central power doesn’t
have to be a government—it could be a mob boss, who threatens Al and
Bob with death if they were to break their silence. It could be the Inte rna­
tional Olympic Committee , with the power to suspend or disqualify ath­
letes who test positive for illegal substances. But in the most general case
in which we are faced with anarchy and are trying to escape from utter
lawlessness, what we need is a government to enforce basic rules o f coop­
eration. Without a central government, the situation will spiral downhill
into a battle ground of competing factions and individuals , warlords and
gang bosses each vying for as much power and wealth as possible. A war
of all against all w ont be far be hind.
The Advantages of Contractarianism
Contractarianis m has many advantages. Here are some of the most impor­
tant ones
M o r a lity Is Es s e ntia lly a So c ia l P he no m e no n
For anyone all alone on a desert island or at a remote mountain retreat,
there is no pos sibility of moral or immoral action. That is because moral
rules are nothing other than special rules of cooperation, and when it
comes to cooperation, it takes at least two to tango.
This explains why we have no self- regarding moral duties (duties that
apply only to oneself). True, we can fail ourselves in a numbe r o f ways.
Ch apt e r 13 The Social Cont ract Tradition: The Theory and Its Attractions
201
We can become strung- out addicts and ruin our potential. We can make
poor financial decisions that leave us bankrupt. We can make an awful
career choice and spend our days in drudgery. In all of these cases we are
highly imprude nt. But when such actions have no bearing on others (they
often do, of course) the n contractarians will deny that there is anything
immoral about them.
Co n tr a c ta r ia n is m Ex pla ins a n d Jus tifie s the C o n te n t
o f the Bas ic M o r a l Rule s
On the contractarian account, the moral rules are ones that are me ant to
govern social cooperation. Whe n trying to figure out which standards are
genuinely moral ones contractarians ask us to imagine a group of free
equal, and rational people who are seeking terms o f cooperation that
each could reasonably accept. The rules they select to govern their lives
together are the moral rules. These will closely match the central moral
rules we have long taken for granted.
John Rawls (1921- 2002) the most famous twentieth- century social
contract theorist had a specific test for de te rmining the rules that the
ideal social contractors would support. In his Theory o f Justice 1 by most
accounts the most important work of political philos ophy written in the
last century, Rawls has us envision contractors be hind a ve il o f ignorance .
This is an imaginary device that erases all knowledge o f your distinctive
traits. Those be hind the veil know that they have certain basic human
needs and wants, but they know nothing of the ir religious identity, the ir
ethnicity, the ir social or economic status the ir sex, or their moral char­
acter. The idea is to put everyone on an equal footing so that the choices
they make are completely fair.
Whe n placed be hind a veil o f ignorance, or in some other condition
of equality and freedom, what social rules will rational people select?
These will almost certainly include prohibitions of killing, rape, battery
theft, and fraud, and rules that require keeping ones word, re turning what
one owes, and being respectful o f others. Contractarianis m thus easily
accounts for why the central moral rules are what they are—rational, self­
interested people, free o f coercion, would agree to obey them, so long as
others are willing to obey them, too.
1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard Unive rsity Press, 1971).
202
T h e F u n d a m e n t a l s o f E t h ic s
The rules o f cooperation must be designed to benefit everyone, not
just a few. Otherwise, only a few would rationally endorse them, while
the rest would rationally ignore them. This allows the contractarian to
explain why slavery and racial and sexual dis crimination are so deeply
immoral. Biased policies unde rmine the primary point of morality—to
create f…
Purchase answer to see full
attachment