Indiana Wesleyan University HIPAA Statutes and Rules Research Paper Introduction and Alignment In this activity, you will write a paper based on HIPAA sta

Indiana Wesleyan University HIPAA Statutes and Rules Research Paper Introduction and Alignment

In this activity, you will write a paper based on HIPAA statutes and rules that directly impact HIT. The HIPAA Administrative Simplification Statute and Rules discusses standardization applied to healthcare data. The HIPAA Privacy Rule defines the people and organizations to whom the rule applies, what information is protected, and disclosure of the information. The HIPAA Security Rule describes the safeguards needed to ensure the protection of healthcare data and covered persons as defined under HIPAA.

Upon completion of this assignment, you should be able to:

Demonstrate HIPAA’s administrative simplification provisions.
Examine the technical safeguards of the HIPAA Security Rule and demonstrate how they are applied.
Resources
Textbook: Information Systems for Healthcare Management
Website: HIPAA Administrative Simplification Statute and Rules
Website: Summary of HIPAA Security Rule
Website: Summary of HIPAA Privacy Rule
Website: OCLS Library
Website: HIPAA Quiz (Optional)
Background Information

This assignment will assess you on the HIPAA Administrative Simplification Statute and Rules, the HIPAA Security Rule, and the HIPAA Privacy Rule.

Instructions
Read the “HIPAA Administrative Simplification Statute and Rules” at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/index.html.
Review the links to each rule.
Select one of the eight major components on page 58 of your textbook, Information Systems for Healthcare Management.
Choose a rule from the Simplification Statute.
Discuss the features of a health information system related to this rule, or give an example of a health information transaction that would be applicable to your chosen area.
Read the “Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule” at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/srsummary.html.
Conduct further research on one of the safeguards.
Explain why it would be important for a health information professional to be familiar with your chosen safeguard.
Find the “Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule” at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html.
Read the following sections:
Introduction
Who Is Covered by the Privacy Rule
What Information Is Protected
General Principle for Uses and Disclosures
Enforcement and Penalties for Noncompliance
Briefly explain the basic principle behind the Privacy Rule.
Write one research paper addressing each point above (1–3). Format your paper according to APA style (6th edition).
A reference list is required, but a cover page is not.
The content of the paper should be two to four pages in length.
Provide at least one resource from a peer-reviewed journal.
You can use the resources provided and/or the OCLS Library (https://oak.indwes.edu/).
Be sure to title the document, “Workshop Two HIPAA Statutes and Rules Research Paper.”
When you’ve completed your assignment, save a copy for yourself and submit a copy to your instructor using the Dropbox by the end of the workshop.
OPTIONAL: You can test your knowledge of HIPAA by completing the online quiz at http://hitnots.com/hipaa-quiz/. 832
Our Duties to Animals
observation, and then carefully replaced it with its leaf on the tree
so that it should not come to harm through any act of his. He would
have been sorry—a natural feeling for a humane man—to destroy
such a creature for no reason. Tender feelings towards dumb animals develop humane feelings towards mankind. In England butchers and doctors do not sit on a jury because they are accustomed to
the sight of death and hardened. U_
who use living animals for their experiments, certainly act cruelly, although their aim
is praiseworthy, and they can justify theiraueltY since animals must
be regarded as man’s instruments; but any sucl L
– cuellylkjportanno . s out his ass or his dog because
‘ tliea.nimal can no longer earn its keep manifests a.small-The
Greeks’ ideas in this respect were highminded, as can be seen from
the fable of the ass and the bell of ingratitude. Our duties towards
animals, then, are indirect duties toward
For Further Reflection
1. According to Kant do animals have rights? What capacity do
they lack that deprives them of rights?
2. Why should we be kind to animals? Do you agree with Kant?
How would an opponent respond to Kant’s arguments?
Animal Liberation
All Animals Are Equal
PETER SINGER
Peter Singer did his graduate work at Oxford University
and is a member of the Philosophy Department at La Trobe
University in Australia. His book, Animal Liberation (1975),
From Philosophical Exchange Vol. 1.5 (1976). Reprinted by permission.
Singer/Animal Liberation
833
from which the following selection is based, is one of the
most influential books ever written on the subject. It has
con
vETEd—
r
rfiany -to the animal rights movement. Singer
argues that animal liberation today is analogous to racial
anct„gensierjusfice in the past. Just-as-peopfe -tynee- thought
it incredible that women or blacks should be treated as
equal to white men, so now siAciesistsInock the idea that
all animals should be given equar consideration. Singer
defines “speciesism” (a term devised by Richard Ryder) as
tlir;jr
ti,fied bias) that_ fay,Q0 ons,.’s own species
over every other. What equalizes all sentient beings is our
a ility to siiff&f.”-In that, we and animals are equal and
tleserYing -of equal consideration of interests. Singer’s argument is a uglittle.„14,y,ilag as its goal the maximization of interest satisfaction.
In recent years a number of oppressed groups have campaigned vigorously for equality. The classic instance is the Black Liberation movement, which demands an end to the prejudice and discrimination that
has made blacks second-class citizens. The immediate appeal of the
black liberation movement and its initial, if limited, success made it
a model for other oppressed groups to follow. We became familiar
with liberation movements for Spanish-Americans, gay people, and
a variety of other minorities. When a majority group—womenbegan their campaign, some thought we had come to the end of the
road. Discrimination on the basis of sex, it has been said, is the last
universally accepted form of discrimination, practiced without
secrecy or pretense even in those liberal circles that have long prided
themselves on their freedom from prejudice against racial minorities.
One should always be wary of talking of “the last remaining
form of discrimination.” If we have learned anything from the liberation movements, we should have learnt how difficult it is to be
aware of latent prejudice in our attitudes to particular groups until
this prejudice is forcefully pointed out.
A liberation movement demands an expansion of our moral horizons and an extension or reinterpretation of the basic moral principle of equality. Practices that were previously regarded as natural and inevitable come to be seen as the result of an unjustifiable
prejudice. Who can say with confidence that all his or her attitudes
834
Our Duties to Animals
and practices are beyond criticism? If we wish to avoid being numbered amongst the oppressors, we must be prepared to re-think
even our most fundamental attitudes. We need to consider them
from the point of view of those most disadvantaged by our attitudes, and the practices that follow from these attitudes. If we can
make this unaccustomed mental switch we may discover a pattern
in our attitudes and practices that consistently operates so as to
benefit one group—usually the one to which we ourselves belong—
at the expense of another. In this way we may come to see that
there is a case for a new liberation movement. My aim is to advocate that we make this mental switch in respect of our attitudes
and practices towards a very large group of beings: members of
species other than our own—or, as we popularly though misleadingly call them, animals. In other words, I am urging that we extend
to other species the basic principle of equality that most of us recognize should be extended to all members of our own species.
All this may sound a little far-fetched, more like a parody of other
liberation movements than a serious objective. In fact, in the past the
idea of “The Rights of Animals” really has been used to parody the
case for women’s rights. When Mary Wollstonecroft, a forerunner of
later feminists, published her Vindication of the Rights of Women in
1792, her ideas were widely regarded as absurd, and they were satirized in an anonymous publication entitled A Vindication of the
Rights of Brutes. The author of this satire (actually Thomas Taylor, a
distinguished Cambridge philosopher) tried to refute Wollstonecroft’s reasonings by showing that they could be carried one stage
further. If sound when applied to women, why should the arguments
not be applied to dogs, cats, and horses? They seemed to hold equally
well for these “brutes”; yet to hold that brutes had rights was manifestly absurd; therefore the reasoning by which this conclusion had
been reached must be unsound, and if unsound when applied to
brutes, it must also be unsound when applied to women, since the
very same arguments had been used in each case.
One way in which we might reply to this argument is by saying
that the case for equality between men and women cannot validly
be extended to nonhuman animals. Women have a right to vote, for
instance, because they are just as capable of making rational decisions as men are; dogs, on the other hand, are incapable of understanding the significance of voting, so they cannot have the right to
Singer/Animal Liberation
835
vote. There are many other obvious ways in which men and women
resemble each other closely, while humans and other animals differ
greatly. So, it might be said, men and women are similar beings, and
should have equal rights, while humans and nonhumans are different and should not have equal rights.
The thought behind this reply to Taylor’s analogy is correct up to
a point, but it does not go far enough. There are important differences between humans and other animals, and these differences
must give rise to some differences in the rights that each have. Recognizing this obvious fact, however, is no barrier to the case for
extending the basic principle of equality to nonhuman animals. The
differences that exist between men and women are equally undeniable, and the supporters of Women’s Liberation are aware that these
differences may give rise to different rights. Many feminists hold that
women have the right to an abortion on request. It does not follow
that since these same people are campaigning for equality between
men and women they must support the right of men to have abortions too. Since a man cannot have an abortion, it is meaningless to
talk of his right to have one. Since a pig can’t vote, it is meaningless
to talk of its right to vote. There is no reason why either Women’s
Liberation or Animal Liberation should get involved in such nonsense. The extension of the basic principle of equality from one
group to another does not imply that we must treat both groups in
exactly the same way, or grant exactly the same rights to both groups.
Whether we should do so will depend on the nature of the members
of the two groups. The basic principle of equality, I shall argue, is
equality of consideration; and equal consideration for different
beings may lead to different treatment and different rights.
So there is a different way of replying to Taylor’s attempt to parody Wollstonecroft’s arguments, a way which does not deny the
differences between humans and nonhumans, but goes more deeply
into the question of equality, and concludes by finding nothing
absurd in the idea that the basic principle of equality applies to socalled “brutes.” I believe that we reach this conclusion if we examine the basis on which our opposition to discrimination on grounds
of race or sex ultimately rests. We will then see that we would be
on shaky ground if we were to demand equality for blacks, women,
and other groups of oppressed humans while denying equal consideration to nonhumans.
836
Our Duties to Animals
When we say that all human beings, whatever their race, creed
or sex, are equal, what is it that we are asserting? Those who wish
to defend a hierarchical, inegalitarian society have often pointed
out that by whatever test we choose, it simply is not true that all
humans are equal. Like it or not, we must face the fact that humans
come in different shapes and sizes; they come with differing moral
capacities, differing intellectual abilities, differing amounts of benevolent feeling and sensitivity to the needs of others, differing abilities to communicate effectively, and differing capacities to experience pleasure and pain. In short, if the demand for equality were
based on the actual equality of all human beings, we would have
to stop demanding equality. It would be an unjustifiable demand.
Still, one might cling to the view that the demand for equality
among human beings is based on the actual equality of the different races and sexes. Although humans differ as individuals in various ways, there are no differences between the races and sexes
as such. From the mere fact that a person is black, or a woman,
we cannot infer anything else about that person. This, it may be
said, is what is wrong with racism and sexism. The white racist
claims that whites are superior to blacks, but this is false—although
there are differences between individuals, some blacks are superior to some whites in all of the capacities and abilities that could
conceivably be relevant. The opponent of sexism would say the
same: a person’s sex is no guide to his or her abilities, and this is
why it is unjustifiable to discriminate on the basis of sex.
This is a possible line of objection to racial and sexual discrimination. It is not, however, the way that someone really concerned
about equality would choose, because taking this line could, in some
circumstances, force one to accept a most inegalitarian society. The
fact that humans differ as individuals, rather than as races or sexes,
is a valid reply to someone who defends a hierarchical society like,
say, South Africa, in which all whites are superior in status to all
blacks. The existence of individual variations that cut across the lines
of race or sex, however, provides us with no defence at all against
a more sophisticated opponent of equality, one who proposes that,
say, the interests of those with I.Q. ratings above 100 be preferred to
the interests of those with I.Q.s below 100. Would a hierarchical society of this sort really be so much better than one based on race or
sex? I think not. But if we tie the moral principle of equality to the
factual equality of the different races or sexes, taken as a whole, our
Singer/Animal Liberation
837
opposition to racism and sexism does not provide us with any basis
for objecting to this kind of inegalitarianism.
There is a second important reason why we ought not to base
our opposition to racism and sexism on any kind of factual equality, even the limited kind which asserts that variations in capacities
and abilities are spread evenly between the different races and
sexes: we can have no absolute guarantee that these abilities and
capacities really are distributed evenly, without regard to race or
sex, among human beings. So far as actual abilities are concerned,
there do seem to be certain measurable differences between both
races and sexes. These differences do not, of course, appear in
each case, but only when averages are taken. More important still,
we do not yet know how much of these differences is really due
to the different genetic endowments of the various races and sexes,
and how much is due to environmental differences that are the
result of past and continuing discrimination. Perhaps all of the
important differences will eventually prove to be environmental
rather than genetic. Anyone opposed to racism and sexism will certainly hope that this will be so, for it will make the task of ending
discrimination a lot easier; nevertheless it would be dangerous to
rest the case against racism and sexism on the belief that all significant differences are environmental in origin. The opponent of,
say, racism who takes this line will be unable to avoid conceding
that if differences in ability did after all prove to have some genetic
connection with race, racism would in some way be defensible.
It would be folly for the opponent of racism to stake his whole
case on a dogmatic commitment to one particular outcome of a difficult scientific issue which is still a long way from being settled.
While attempts to prove that differences in certain selected abilities
between races and sexes are primarily genetic in origin have certainly not been conclusive, the same must be said of attempts to
prove that these differences are largely the result of environment.
At this stage of the investigation we cannot be certain which view
is correct, however much we may hope it is the latter.
Fortunately, there is no need to pin the case for equality to one
particular outcome of this scientific investigation. The appropriate
response to those who claim to have found evidence of genetically
based differences in ability between the races or sexes is not to
stick to the belief that the genetic explanation must be wrong, whatever evidence to the contrary may turn up: instead we should make
Our Duties to Animals
838
it quite clear that the claim to equality does not depend on intelligence, moral capacity, physical strength, or similar matters of fact.
Equality is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion of fact. There is no
logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference
in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount
of 5i2;gjration tve g ea needs and interests. he
principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of
an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of
how we should treat humans.
Jeremy Bentham incorporated the essential basis of moral equality into his utilitarian system of ethics in the formula: “Each to count
for one and none for more than one.” In other words, the interests
of every being affected by an action a,.w into account
and given the same weight as theFlike interests of an other being.
A later u”
int in this way: “The
good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the
point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of
any other.” 1 More recently, the leading figures in contemporary
moral philosophy have shown a great deal of agreement in specifying as a fundamental presupposition of their moral theories some
similar requirement which operates so as to give everyone’s interests equal consideration—although they cannot agree on how this
requirement is best formulated. 2
It is an implication of this principle of equality that our concern
for others ought not to depend on what they are like, or what abilities they possess—although precisely what this concern requires
us to do may vary according to the characteristics of those affected
by what we do. It is on this basis that the case against racism and
the case against sexism must both ultimately rest; and it is in accordance with this principle that speciesism is also to be condemned.
If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one
–
Methods of Ethics (7th Ed.), p. 382.
example, R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford, 1963) and J. Rawls,
A Theory ofJustice (Harvard, 1972) a brief account of the essential agreement on this issue between these and other positions, see R. M. Hare,
“Rules of War and Moral Reasoning,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol.
1, no. 2 (1972).
1 The
2 For
Singer/Animal Liberation
839
human to use another for his own ends, how can it entitle humans
to exploit nonhumans?
Many philosophers have proposed the principle . of–equal consideratiOli of interests, in some form or other, as a basic moral princi , ut as we s a see in more detail shortly, not many of them
hay recognised that this principle applies to members of other
species as well as to our own. Bentham was one of the few who
did realize this. In a forward-looking passage, written at a time
when black slaves in the British dominions were still being treated
much as we now treat nonhuman animals, Bentham wrote:
,
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire
those rights which never could have been witholden from them but
by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the
blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be
abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one
day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons
equally insufficient for, abandoning a sensitive being to the same
fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the
faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a fullgrown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well
as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week,
or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would
it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk?
but, Can they suffer?3
In this passage Bentham points to the capacity for suffering as
the vital characteristic that gives a being the right to equal consideration. The capacity for suffering—or more strictly, for suffering
and/or enjoyment or happiness—is not just another characteristic
like the capacity for language, or for higher mathematics. Bentham
is not saying that those who try to mark “the insuperable line” that
determines whether the interests of a being should be considered
happen to have selected the wrong characteristic. The capacity for
suffering and enjoying things is a pre-requisite for having interests
at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of
3lntroduction
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. XVII.
840
Our Duties to Animals
interests in any meaningful way. It would be nonsense to say that
it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked along the road
by a schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it cannot
suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare. A mouse, on the other hand, does have an
interest in not being tormented, because it will suffer if it is.
If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what the
nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering—in so far as rough
comparisons can be made—of any other being. If a being is not
capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness,
there is nothing to be taken into account. This is why the limit of
sentience (using the term as a convenient, if not strictly accurate,
shorthand …
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