Ethical Practice and Legislation Paper no plagiarize, spell check, and check your grammar. Please only use the reference below. Use references below Clien

Ethical Practice and Legislation Paper no plagiarize, spell check, and check your grammar. Please only use the reference below. Use references below

Clients must be assured that all aspects of their communication with any professional regarding themselves or their family members will be held in the strictest confidence. Clients who cannot trust professionals to treat information as confidential may withhold information that is important to investigation, assessment, and treatment. When professionals disregard the privacy of their clients, the clients are injured in obvious and/or subtle ways. A professional code of ethics provides guidance here. Codes of ethics fulfill three major objectives: to educate professionals about sound ethical conduct, to provide a mechanism for professional accountability, and to be a catalyst for improving practice. In this way, they provide a foundation for professional competency and integrity.

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In a 4-page) paper (excluding references and title page), discuss how your professional ethics code fulfills these objectives. As ethical issues are also influenced by legislation, discuss how you believe legislation could likewise contribute to the fulfillment of these objectives. Discuss the most significant ways that you believe legislation and ethical codes can affect your future professional practice. To support your ideas, cite one or more landmark court cases from our readings addressing responsible ethical and legal professional practice, and discuss implications for ethical and responsible practice. This paper should reflect an integration of your knowledge of ethical practice, ethical codes, and legislative influences on professional practice. In addition to the required readings, cite at least two scholarly references.

References

American Psychological Association. (2017). Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, Including 2010 and 2016 Amendments [Web page]. Retrieved from http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/ (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

Annas, G. J. (2006, September 28). Hunger strikes at Guantanamo — Medical ethics and human rights in a “legal black hole.” New England Journal of Medicine, 355(13), 1377-1382.

Bokhari, M., Saadan, R., Pilus, A. M., Hassan, S. N. S., Jano, Z., Ishak, N. M., & Mahmud, Z. (2014, July 24). Contribution of awareness and understanding in legal and ethics towards the practice of confidentiality amongst counselors [PDF file]. Asian Social Science, 10(16), 144-151. https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v10n16p144 (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

Gaumnitz, B. R., & Lere, J. C. (2002, January). Contents of codes of ethics of professional business organizations in the United States. Journal of Business Ethics, 35(1), 35-49.

Joy, P., & McMunigal, K. C. (2017, Winter). When does monitoring defendants and their lawyers cross the line? [PDF file]. Criminal Justice, 31(4), 46-51. Retrieved from https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_magazine/v31/CJ_v031n04_McMUNIGAL.authcheckdam.pdf (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

Rogers, R., Boals, A., & Drogin, E. Y. (2011). Applying cognitive models of deception to

national security investigations: Considerations of psychological research, law, and

ethical practice. Journal of Psychiatry & Law, 39(2), 339–364. https://doi-org.proxy-

library.ashford.edu/10.1177/009318531103900209 Journal of Psychiatry & Law 39/Summer 2011
339
Applying cognitive models of
deception to national security
investigations: Considerations
of psychological research, law,
and ethical practice
BY RICHARD ROGERS, PH.D., ADRIEL BOALS, PH.D.,
AND ERIC Y. DROGIN, J.D., PH.D.
The current threat of global terrorism has sparked a renewed
interest in the development of more effective methods for the detection
of deception. In the United States, the American Psychological
Association (APA)—spurred by torture allegations involving terrorist
suspects—established guidelines for professional practice regarding
investigative methods that could be conceptualized as coercive. As
affirmed by APA, psychological research can play an active and
ethical role in the development of standardized methods for the
detection of deception. Instead of focusing on external sources
of terrorism, this conceptual paper argues for programmatic research
on insider threats, specifically risks to national security posed by
government and other employees. In briefly reviewing deception
research, recent investigations of cognitive loads and deceptions hold
particular promise, especially studies that systematically manipulate
levels of cognitive load. These methods can be extended to collateral
sources, further minimizing ethical concerns while broadening the
scope of deception investigation.
KEY WORDS: Deception, cognitive load, impression management,
background investigations, national security.
AUTHORS’ NOTE: For additional information about this article, please contact:
Richard Rogers, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, University of North Texas,
1155 Union Circle, #311280, Denton, TX 76203. E-Mail: rogersr@unt.edu.
© 2011 by Federal Legal Publications, Inc.
340
COGNITIVE MODELS OF DECEPTION
In the post 9/11 world, the critical balance in the United
States between national security interests and constitutional
protections for federal and civilian employees is increasingly
challenging to maintain. Regarding national security, the
profound implications of even a few “missed” espionage
cases cannot be overestimated. According to the Department
of Defense (DoD) Personnel Security Research Center (Herbig, 2008), only 37 known spies initiated espionage activities in the United States since 1990; however, this small
number tells only part of the story, since approximately 25%
of recently apprehended spies had conducted lengthy espionage careers spanning two decades or more before their
eventual apprehensions (see Herbig, 2008, Appendix A).
Moreover, these numbers constitute a significant underestimate “based largely on open sources” (p. 1); the true number—including classified cases, cases under investigation,
and undiscovered cases—cannot be known. Such cases
inflict astronomical costs upon national security, compromising top-secret technology at a loss of what has been estimated as “billions of dollars” (Lang, 2005, p. 33). Moreover,
other insider threats (e.g., sabotage and other maliciously
counterproductive activities) share similar patterns with espionage and also critically endanger national security (Band et
al., 2006). Beyond strictly financial implications, the
National Threat Center of the U. S. Secret Service (Kowalski
et al., 2008) has further concluded that sabotage activities
can potentially destabilize core American infrastructures,
such as telecommunications and the energy grid.
From a legal perspective, procedural fairness for federal and
civilian employees is enshrined in the United States Constitutional right to due process. The Sixth Amendment protects
each person from being “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” and this protection is
extended to individual states by the 14th Amendment. In
Mathews v. Eldridge (1976), the Supreme Court of the
United States held that “procedural” due process in noncriminal matters “requires analysis of the governmental and
341
private interests that are affected” (p. 335) to determine
whether sufficiently vital reasons can justify the government’s actions. Of relevance to background investigations,
Mathews and its appellate progeny afford employees procedural justice via “the same due process values developed
within the court system” pertaining to “administrative
agency proceedings or judicial settings outside of trial”
(Kuckes, 2006, p. 10). In addition, “substantive” due process must also be afforded: Irrespective of whether codified
rules were followed appropriately, the Government may not
interfere with rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” (U.S. v. Salerno, 1987, p. 746).
Legally mandated criteria in the United States—the mechanisms for addressing counterproductive behavior—are
framed by security requirements and suitability requirements. Security requirements protect against costly
breaches: “the unauthorized disclosure of information classified in the national interest can cause irreparable damage
to the national security and loss of human life” (Executive
Order 12968). Suitability requirements address problems
with each “individual’s character or conduct that may
impact the efficiency of the service by jeopardizing an
agency’s accomplishment of its duties or responsibilities”
(U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Title 5, Part 731).
Suitability criteria are often the most observable evidence of
problematic behavior, and they often serve as the first indicia of insider threats affecting national security (Lang, 2005;
Reilly & Joyal, 1993). For example, suitability issues of
financial irresponsibility and related debts are common precursors of trust betrayal (Herbig, 2008).
Statutory and public policy changes are increasingly evident
following 9/11 and subsequent terroristic threats. Infringements on individual freedoms, as exemplified by the USA
Patriot Act (2001), were judged to be necessary sacrifices
for national security (Henderson, 2002). The government’s
intense scrutiny increasingly focused on several overlapping
342
COGNITIVE MODELS OF DECEPTION
classes of what the authorities deemed to be potential transgressors, including noncitizens (Cohen, 2010), asylum seekers (Kidane, 2010), investors (Westbrook, 2010), and
persons of color (Tehranian, 2009).
Psychologists’ role with terrorism
Overall, the role of psychology can be characterized as considerably more reactive than proactive in addressing issues
related to national security. Professional practice has
actively responded to the psychological effects of terrorism
by treating clinical populations harmed directly and indirectly by its actions (Johnson & Hobfoll, 2010; Lee, Gibson,
Markon, & Lemyre, 2009). Psychological research through
a slew of research studies and reviews (e.g., Bux & Coyne,
2009; DiMaggio, Galea, & Li, 2009; Kalayjian, Musgrave,
& Aberson, 2010; Scrimin, Moscardino, Capello, Altoe, &
Axia, 2009) has catalogued the effects of terrorism on victims of attacks, persons indirectly exposed to attacks, and
treating mental health providers. However, these professional and research efforts focus on reactions and effects. In
contrast, a proactive approach would emphasize how the
discipline of psychology could contribute new empirical
methods that might assist in minimizing threats—external or
internal— to national security.
A crucial issue is whether the discipline of psychology should
play an active as opposed to passive role in addressing threats
to national security. In this regard, a critical distinction is
drawn in light of the recent controversy regarding APA policy
on interrogation techniques (Behnke, 2006; Carter & Abeles,
2009; Greene & Banks, 2009) between standardized assessments of potential insider threats and coercive methods of
interrogation for detailed suspects. To ensure adherence to
APA policy, ethical standards 1.02 and 1.03 were recently
modified to include the following statement, “under no circumstances may this standard be used to justify or defend
343
violating human rights” (APA, 2010). In an interesting parallel, the Canadian Psychological Association (2000) utilizes a
hierarchical model of ethical principles that places the highest
value on individual rights (Principle I: Respect for the Dignity of Persons) and the lowest value on social responsibility
(Principle IV: Responsibility to Society).
Beyond ethical concerns regarding human rights violations,
psychology’s involvement in national security must also
proceed with deference to Ethical Standard 2.01, Boundaries of Competence (American Psychological Association,
2002). Especially with foreign-based terrorism, any psychological expertise regarding deceptive communications (see
Vrij, 2008a) is likely to be diminished by factors related to
ideology as well as culture, language, and national origin
(see APA, 2.01, section b). In establishing an ethical role for
psychology, this conceptual article concentrates exclusively
on domestic threats to national security with its primary
focus on insider threats.
While cognizant of these legal and ethical issues, psychology has already made important contributions to the study
of response styles and response sets in a variety of professional settings. Its methodological rigor has been applied to
the denial of problematic behaviors (e.g., illicit substance
abuse) and minimizing psychological attributes across the
last several decades (see Rogers, 2008). This rigor can be
applied to developing validated methods for background
investigations, which are designed to identify individuals
who are national security threats. In setting the stage, the
next sections briefly describe the scope of insider threats
and the challenges faced by background investigations. It is
followed by (a) a succinct review of cognitive models of
deception and (b) a focused discussion of cognitive loads
and their potential applications to deceptions in background
investigations. In making the case for systematic research
on background investigations, it is important to understand
the scope of governmental misconduct.
344
COGNITIVE MODELS OF DECEPTION
The scope of insider threats and misconduct
United States federal employees frequently encounter
coworkers whose counterproductive behaviors may affect
the integrity and security of the national government. These
behaviors include improper disclosure of sensitive information and security infractions (DoD Personnel Security
Research Center, 1998, 2007). According to the National
Government Ethics Survey (Ethics Resource Center, 2007),
many U.S. federal employees directly witnessed incidents of
serious misconduct by their colleagues during a recent 12month period: (a) misuse of confidential information (14%),
(b) alteration of governmental documents (9%), (c) intentional alteration of financial records (4%), and (d) acceptance of bribes (2%). Of direct relevance to security
clearances, substantial percentages of federal employees
also have declined to report serious misconduct by both
management (24%) and their colleagues (16%). Similarly,
management personnel seldom report employees’ problematic behaviors such as “emotional or mental, financial, alcohol and drugs, and marital problems, and unusual personal
conduct” (Wood, Crawford, & Lang, 2005, p. xi), unless
they are convinced of a direct linkage to national security.
However, collateral sources are crucial to national security
because impaired employees are unlikely to step forward;
instead, they typically deny emotional and substance abuse
problems to avoid stigmatization and adverse consequences
at work (Clavelle, 2009).
More than 2 million background investigations are conducted each year on federal and military personnel to evaluate their appropriateness for hiring or for continued
employment, according to the most recently published
report to Congress (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1995).
Civilian employees undergo an additional 800,000 such
investigations. The administrative standards for these investigations typically address security risks (e.g., insider
threats) and suitability criteria (e.g., irresponsible behavior
345
and substance abuse). For security issues alone, Lang (2005)
reported that approximately 3.9% of adjudicative decisions
within the DoD were unfavorable. For periodic reinvestigations (e.g., every 5 years) of government employees,
Kramer, Crawford, Heuer, and Hagen (2001) found small
but still appreciable percentages for cases warranting immediate action because of likely misconduct—ranging from
1% for DoD to 5% for the CIA. Representing a lower risk
category, cases possibly requiring action were concerningly
higher. They ranged from about 1/4 (i.e., 23% for DoD) to
1/3 (i.e., 35% for CIA) of all background reinvestigations
(Kramer et al., 2001).
Challenges facing background investigations
A major challenge facing background investigations is
impression management: Subjects (i.e., persons being investigated) and their collateral sources may provide socially
desirable presentations of subjects, denying both their
personality problems and inappropriate activities related to
suitability criteria (see Adjudicative Desk Reference, DoD
Personnel Security Research Center, 2007). As a parallel,
Devan (2004) noted in a very large study of 7,142 police
applicants that the most striking observation was the pervasiveness of impression management: Nearly all applicants
denied any significant psychological problems. Far less
commonly, subjects can also fail to disclose professional
misconduct relevant to national security issues. As an
encompassing term, we operationally define concealments
as the withholding or nondisclosure of potentially damaging
information (e.g., detrimental traits, psychological issues,
and problematic behaviors) within the context of a formal
appraisal. Collateral concealments occur when subjects
are portrayed as too good to be true, a phenomenon sometimes observed in social interactions (Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007).
346
COGNITIVE MODELS OF DECEPTION
Background security investigations in the United States
entail a time-intensive process involving collateral sources,
such as former employers and other persons (e.g., friends,
family, and colleagues; U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2008) with direct knowledge of the subject. Among
other issues, these investigations focus on behavior patterns
and personality characteristics (e.g., narcissism, impulsiveness, and antisocial behavior) that are potential risk factors
for insider threats and workplace violence (Herbig, 2008).
As a related factor, illegal drug use—frequently concealed
by subjects and their collaterals—often reflects a subject’s
tendency toward irresponsible or high-risk behavior and his
or her corresponding susceptibility to blackmail (Wood et
al., 2005). Focusing on background interviews, the DoD
Personnel Security Research Center’s (2007) guidelines
acknowledge the challenges in using collateral sources, who
(a) may not be privy to a target’s questionable behavior and
(b) may be motivated not to disclose either specific knowledge or general reservations about the subject.
For background investigations, collateral concealments can
compromise the usefulness of these external sources for
uncovering problematic issues that were not disclosed by
subjects (Kramer et al., 2001). However, the available data
are only inferential. For instance, Carney (1996) found that
collateral interviews with most relatives were unhelpful at
identifying subjects’ previously-unknown problematic
behaviors. In stark contrast, ex-spouses were 315% more
likely to provide useful data. While this three-fold discrepancy may be explained in part by legitimate issues (e.g., the
divorced subject’s interpersonal conflicts) and false reports
(e.g., “payback”), these data also suggest that some collaterals (e.g., current spouses) may be intentionally concealing
highly detrimental information.
Collateral interviews for background investigations typically pose straightforward questions involving substance
abuse, criminal or immoral behavior, and other issues of
347
personal conduct (for an outline of potential issues, see DoD
Personnel Security Research Center, 2007). Even with the
current methodology, collateral interviews are much more
effective than records for identifying previously undisclosed
problems in the context of background investigations (Carney, 1996). A drawback of straightforward questions is that
socially desirable responses are easily apparent to collateral
sources. Assessment methods are especially vulnerable to
intentional distortions when examinees can simply recognize the “right” answer (Rogers, 2008). In addition, simple
responses (e.g., denial of problems) are the least cognitively
taxing; such easy tasks are easy to deceive and difficult to
detect (Sporer & Schwandt, 2007). For improving methods
used in background investigations, the next section reviews
cognitive models of deception.
Cognitive models of deception
Models of the detection of deception can be conceptualized
broadly as reflecting either arousal-based or cognitive
approaches. Briefly, methods centering upon physiological
and emotional arousal have fallen short of generating effective techniques for detecting deception (Grubin & Madsen,
2005; Vrij, 2008b). One possible reason for their limitations
is that affective arousal is nonspecific to deception (Steinbrook, 1992), which can lead to inflated rates of false positives. For example, methodological controversies continue
regarding the merits of the polygraph (Iacono, 2008) for the
detection of deception in employment settings. The emotions generated by attempts at deception often include fear
and anxiety, which may be indistinguishable from the emotions of an honest person enduring stressful questioning
(Mann & Vrij, 2006). Regarding professional applications
(e.g., background investigations), arousal-based approaches
are often difficult to implement (Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal,
2006). For instance, the assessment of microexpressions
requires sophisticated synchronization of visual stimuli and
348
COGNITIVE MODELS OF DECEPTION
computer-based recording (Porter & ten Brinke, 2008),
which are impractical when conducting background investigations in the community.
Content
analysis
Cognitive methods for the detection of deception can be
conveniently divided into content analyses and cognitive
load approaches. Regarding the former, Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA) was originally developed to evaluate
the veracity of child sexual abuse claims, utilizing 19 criteria to differentiate genuine memories from fabricated
accounts (Vrij, 2000). Originating in the work of Undeutsch
(1982), CBCA is based on hypotheses (see Vrij, 2005) that
focus predominantly on the structure and content of genuine
communications (e.g., greater quantity of detail in honest
responses). Its five criteria posit that deceivers will utilize
impression management based on their stereotypes of truthful communications; this point is also addressed by the
attempted control model. A thoughtful review of CBCA by
Vrij (2005) underscored continued problems with reliability
and validity, including substantial error rates in the 30%
range. Moreover, Kulkofsky (2008) questioned whether the
usefulness of CBCA in detecting deception is confounded
by well-intentioned but ultimately false memories. In summary, CBCA has made important empirical contributions to
the detection of distinct episodic memories. However, it was
not intended for uncovering problematic personality traits
and ongoing counterproductive behaviors.
Reality Monitoring (RM)—sometimes referred to as Interpersonal Source Monitoring (Barnier, Sharman, McKay, &
Sporer, 2005)—represents a very different approach to content analysis (Sporer & Schwandt, 2007). RM attempts to
differentiate externally generated actual memories (i.e.,
previousl…
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